

Editorial

There is no such thing as post-conflict. In the period after large-scale violence has been suspended, some forms of violence continue. Certainly the attitudes and issues which fed the conflict remain in place. Actors are still armed and on alert, jockeying for position, control of resources and influence; the disempowered and vulnerable continue to be vulnerable, disenfranchised and often further exploited. Related conflict issues emerge and widen. Weapons, food, money refugees, consultants flood in, exacerbating tensions and resentment. The infrastructure does not function, and where it does, privileging the few and fuelling anger.

As the six articles contained in this double issue suggest, the urban scale is the site where post-large scale violence dynamics get worked out. Whether it is reconstruction, ceasefires, humanitarian relief, political mobilization or long-term transformation, it is at the city level that analysts should be looking to comprehend dynamics, actors and impact.

Bruce Stanley offers a call to (re)introduce the city into our thinking about the transformation of conflict. As we craft our interventions during the post-violence phase, he argues, we should apply the urban lens to both our analysis and our praxis.

During this period, there are many trials and challenges, Gerd Junne suggests. Analysts must consider carefully the way third parties exacerbate conflicts while they are attempting to support former combatants. There are victims and winners during the violence; and those same communities are usually similarly positioned during the post-violence phase.

Samir Khalaf reads the tea leaves left by the 'July War' and its impact on Lebanon and Beirut, finding some cautious hope for conflict transformation in the changing attitudes and altered political landscape. The urban fabric, for Khalaf, is the proxy war zone for outsiders, leaving bodies, rubble and victims behind in the post-violence phase. The challenge is to nurse those glimmers of hope into a flame for transformation of the conflict.

Rami Nasrallah, in looking at Jerusalem, warns us that powerful actors impose themselves physically on the built environment of cities to shape their triumphal vision of control and claiming. Such urban planning by and for the dominant destroys almost any possibility of a common urban future, destroying the very concept of a city, losing the sense of shared, communal space and of a resolution of conflict.

James Anderson, drawing on the experiences of Belfast, warns that external 'conflict managers' often fail to consider more radical, non-territorial solutions to conflicts, preferring to frame solutions in traditional ways that do little to shake the structural foundations of the conflict.

Francesco Strazzari takes on similar issues, illuminating the shifting nature of the urban-nationalism-conflict dynamic, and how this challenges the nationalist project of political leaders. The concepts of territorial nationalism, as represented by certain Albanian leaders, fails to correspond to the evolving reality of lived city networks experienced by many Albanians in the post violence phase, creating significant challenges for the resolution of conflict.

Together, these offerings reaffirm the significance of focusing on the post-large scale violence phase, and in recognizing the complexity and fragility of its dynamics. There are no simplistic prescriptions, and conventional wisdom, diplomacy and traditional relief aid/development are insufficient. If we wish to enhance the impact of our interventions during this stage, we must adopt new lenses, pay attention to alternative complexities, think outside traditional frameworks, have hope, and be ready for the messy reality of the urban environment. ■

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CONFLICT, CITIES AND UTOPISTICS

Bruce Stanley*

The Centrality of Cities to Conflict

Cities lie at the core of 21st century violent conflict. Our strategic doctrine confirms it. Our headlines shout it. Journalists live it and die from it. Resistance uses it and exploits it. The networks of security cities and arms dealers affirm it. The destruction of energy grids and urban infrastructure initiate it. Cinema portrays and often glorifies it. There is no way around it: cities are key sites, facilitators, targets, resources and often actors in the violence that racks our world.⁽¹⁾

This contemporary realization hides the deeper fact that conflict and cities have always been fundamentally connected: from the walls of Jericho and the fall of Troy to the battle for Stalingrad and the holocaust that was Hiroshima, the history of human conflict has always been about city capture, symbolic destruction, and the imposition of control over this messy chaos we call cities. This is why Year Zero starts with the capture of Phnom Penh, or freedom is assumed to arrive with the capture of Baghdad. Large-scale human conflict has always been, by its very nature, urban in its roots, drive, vision and meaning.

The (Hidden) Contribution of Cities to Managing Conflict

Yet there is little acknowledgement or understanding of the role cities have played or could play in managing, handling or transforming conflict. The historical contribution of cities to resolving conflicts has rarely been codified, although our diplomatic terminology is replete with indications of some role: the Peace of Utrecht, the Taif Agreement, the Oslo Accords, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Accords, Venice Declaration, etc. And historians tell us that city officials regularly negotiated safe transit, cease fires, prisoner exchanges, termination of gang wars, resource sharing, bridging projects, or joint sports games to limit conflict. The historical record also indicates that groups of cities worked together to stop conflicts before they broke out, or to provide humanitarian relief for the citizens of other cities in the wake of destruction or violence.

Certainly the conflict resolution literature has placed little emphasis on their role, except in specific contexts such as post-conflict reconstruction, and even then only as sites for the action of others.⁽²⁾ There is certainly little evaluation of their historical contribution to managing conflict. Types of actors, such as NGOs, the media and business, garner much more attention from the peacebuilding fraternity than do cities, and few authors have ever suggested adding them into the 'multi-track diplomacy' or Track Two that appears to be evolving.⁽³⁾

Perhaps we are missing an opportunity here, one that could expand the collection of tools in our peacebuilding toolbox. If we work to 'bring cities back in' to our analysis and actions to transform violent conflict, there might be considerable gain in our analytical insight into conflict, but also a widening of the possibilities for transformation.⁽⁴⁾ We need, as Johan Galtung suggested, to 'have a look at the possibilities (for peace) if there could be more city-logic and less state-logic in the world.'

What Cities Can Contribute to Peacebuilding

The conflict resolution (CR) literature contains numerous suggestions for improving our ability to transform conflict. Many such suggestions, when viewed through an urban lens, mesh well with the capabilities and potential of cities as actors and facilitators. Let me emphasize six in particular.

One is that the transformation of conflict requires intervention across all the stages of conflict, not just during the period when violence has broken out. Recent attention to both conflict prevention, and to post-conflict reconstruction, expands our understanding of the multiple phases during escalation and de-escalation of conflict when interventions by third parties might have a peace building impact. Given that states and multilateral institutions are more focused on crisis response and managing violence, and have difficulty with getting involved early before violence or remaining involved for the long term after the violence is over, this expansion of our field of vision opens up the arena for non-state actors to play a role. Institutions and groups within cities, and cities themselves, are extremely sensitive to emerging conflicts, and often have appropriate resources and tested techniques to prevent escalation. Likewise, they are better placed for long-term post-conflict reconstruction, since they are usually the sites and agency for much of this activity.⁽⁵⁾ This appropriateness and sensitivity across all stages of conflict can, if consulted and affirmed, allow cities and their actors to play a greater role in peace making.

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- (1) Stephen Graham, ed. *Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics*. Oxford, Blackwell, 2004.
- (2) Sultan Barakat takes up cities and their centrality to post conflict reconstruction. See, for example, his 'City War Zones' at www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/urban/urb_age/city_war.doc
- (3) International Alert does not mention cities in its work, nor do Louise Diamond and John McDonald in their *Multitrack Diplomacy*. West Hartford, CT, Kumarian Press, 1996.
- (4) Bruce Stanley, 'City Wars or Cities of Peace: (Re) Integrating the Urban into Conflict Resolution' *GaWC Research Bulletin #123*, 2003. www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/rb/rb123.html
- (5) See the interview with Gerd Junne in this issue.

Another suggestion emerging from the CR literature is that reaching the combatants where they live, interact and draw their resources is crucial to the success of interventions. It is the combatants, and those who are most directly touched by the violence, who must be engaged to modify the attitudes and behaviours that foster it.⁽⁶⁾ It is in the cities that so many of the combatants and supporters are resident. They must be engaged, and cities, as facilitators of dialogue, or as parties offering their good offices, for example, can be very useful. Cities have long experience in modulating citizen relations, creating bridges and functional opportunities to transcend conventional boundaries, or repressing violence. Often cities and their elites, by knowing the combatants intimately, have been able to employ economic statecraft and deny resources (or make them available) in effective ways. This experience with containing or handling local conflict has usually been dismissed as irrelevant to global or regional conflicts.⁽⁷⁾ Yet the call for local engagement forces us to reconsider the urban scale as a space for action and a key site for governance.

The conflict resolution literature also makes the case for appropriate and sustainable best practice. We have so few studies of non-state interventions into conflict that it is hard to understand what is possible and what is not. Where do we look to gain appropriate strategies and tactics? Current literature turns to the experience of media, business, professional conflict resolution organizations, etc. for insight.⁽⁸⁾ With five thousand years of experience with conflict, the examples generated by cities and city networks working to manage and transform conflict should offer a vast collection of case studies from which to draw. Unfortunately, to date we have generally ignored this rich archive.⁽⁹⁾ Additionally, the relevant experiences and best practice of cities struggling across similar types of issues offers comparative and perhaps more sustainable models on which to draw, unlike much of the irrelevant state-level experience touted by multilateral development agencies.

Fourth, the literature reminds us that contemporary conflict is supported and encouraged via global urban networks. Whether it is blood diamonds or the shipments of small arms and drugs that permeate conflict zones, it is the global urban network and the military geographies which lie within it that help to fuel these conflicts. The political economy of 21st century violence uses these networks.⁽¹⁰⁾ In addition, local actors are now players in global politics, whether they travel or not. Thus, it is responsible intervention to mobilize global urban networks, or their regional forms, to help manage and transform such conflicts. Cities are embedded in global networks, and are more usefully understood as not so much a place as a 'space of flows.' We need to use this key characteristic of cities in our peacebuilding as we work to develop resources to support peace constituencies.⁽¹¹⁾ Interestingly, the CR literature is replete with examples of states networking to modulate global violence, or

with a focus on NGOs networking globally for peace building. Why not networks or sub-networks of cities as powerful tools for change and sanctions against repressive networks as well? Significantly, cities pursuing their own municipal foreign policy, ad hoc global city networks focusing on a particular issue (i.e. the Cities for Peace coalition prior to the invasion of Iraq, www.citiesforprogress.org), or permanent networks of cities (i.e. Metropolis www.metropolis.org or the Global Forum www.glocalforum.org) are becoming more involved in local and global peace issues, and in acts of resistance and voice.

Fifth, the belief that citizenship, democracy and tolerance are necessary to the emergence of stable, responsive and claiming political communities, and thus crucial to the emergence of a culture of peace, quickly draws us back to the urban scale.⁽¹²⁾ In thinking about democracy and citizenship spatially, we are led to conclude that the state is a poor instrument for voice, pluralism and diversity. It does not support citizenship very well, forcing it into very narrow and stylized forms. The city, however, has long been viewed as an appropriate and (often) responsive vessel for citizenship and participation. Within a re-visioning of citizenship for the 21st century, a reawakening of our understandings of polis and civitas at the urban level is central to peacebuilding. As we seek to find alternatives to the 'killing solidarities' that drive violence, urban-based rights offer interesting alternatives. In particular, the debate over the struggle for public space enshrined in the concept 'the right to the city' has much to help us in working toward conflict transformation.⁽¹³⁾

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- (6) Sultan Barakat and Gerd Junne both stress this point in their various publications.
 - (7) John Burton argues that the separation into domestic and international insights into CR is artificial. He stresses instead that 'a dialogue between domestic conflict-resolution and global conflict-resolution theorists and practitioners can be mutually beneficial.' This view is derived from his belief that the dynamics of conflict and conflict escalation are not that different across scales. See John Vasquez, James Johnson, Sanford Jaffe, Linda Stamato, eds. *Beyond Confrontation*. Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 1995, pg. 220.
 - (8) See *Conciliation Resources*: on-line magazine, *Accord*, for some interesting examples, including a few of cities as sites and actors in transforming conflict. www.c-r.org/our-work/accord
 - (9) Roland Paris, in his book *At Wars End: Building Peace After Civil Conflicts*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pg. 188 argues for a peacebuilding strategy in the post conflict phase which he terms 'Institutionalization Before Liberalization'. Although he does not mention cities, all of his proposals actually have a crucial urban dimension which is unfortunately lacking from his analysis.
 - (10) See, for example, Rachel Woodward, *Military Geographies*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
 - (11) John Paul Lederach. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington. United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, pg. 97.
 - (12) Engin F. Isin, ed. *Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City*. London, Routledge, 2000, pg. 5. See also the special issue of the journal *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 3, number 2, July 1999 on 'Cities and Citizenship in a Global Age'.
 - (13) Don Mitchell, *The Right to the City*. New York, The Guilford Press, 2003.

In a related concern, there is much recent attention to the significance of identity and belonging in empowering conflict transformation. Former combatants who have a sense of their own identity, self-worth and cultural heritage make more stable partners for transformation. Equally, emergent cultures of violence need to be addressed if transformation is to progress. The 'new urbanism' literature frequently deals with questions of identity within globalization, and how this is working itself out at the urban level. The city may in fact offer an appropriate and user-friendly identity for those caught up in conflicts originating from other claims establishing boundedness and exclusion.

Utopistics and the role of the urban

In 1999, Immanuel Wallerstein called for consideration of what he called utopistics, the search for a 'strategy for change' that offered a project of inventing the future. He argued that we needed to 'debate priorities and the nature of institutions that could implement them,' always being aware that our concern should be with 'the struggles that go on now at the local level... that impinge on how lives are led... (since) all such struggles are local.'⁽¹⁴⁾ It is in answer to that call that I propose adding an urban lens to our toolbox of approaches to conflict transformation. Certainly when it comes to our skills in transforming conflicts, we need to garner as much help as we possibly can. We need to gain greater power and energy from our interventions into halting violence and attempts to transform the fundamentals of conflict. One way to do that is to include both more actors and the right actors into our consideration. We have been seduced by the state's claim to the right of a monopoly on the organization and mobilization of political space, and thus over the management of conflict. Yet we live in an era where the state has consistently failed to manage social conflicts in productive and positive ways. They are often part of the problem, as well as only one component of the solution. Our job is to investigate across the scales, looking for quality intervention actors and sites that can empower our ability to prevent, mitigate or transform violent conflict. Cities have for too long be excluded from our thinking, and need to be 'brought back in' to our calculations as part of a strategy for transforming the future.

Cities as sites, facilitators and as actors in the resolution of conflict do present, as do all interveners, their own set of problems and weaknesses. We should not be sanguine about their capacity for agency in such circumstances. Yet they offer much that has been ignored. They have considerable experience with conflict; they are at appropriate scales of identity, citizenship and participation to allow engagement and dialogue; they are more user-friendly than the state. Networks of cities can often bring passive or disruptive states into line, and their resources for addressing issues are much more substantial than that of NGOs. They also offer coalitions of business,

civil society, community-based organizations and public officials that are difficult to create at the national level. Minorities and the disenfranchised have a greater chance for voice and reciprocity within political space of the urban scale. The solutions of city leaders to conflict prevention or post-conflict reconstruction have often been, across four millennia, successful. And cities are de-militarized in significant ways that may mean that their engagement in conflict handling is somewhat less threatening and more positive.

If we were to actually do our homework, we might find that, wherever in the world we look, for whatever time period, cities and their actors were deeply involved in managing, handling and transforming conflict. What we need to do now is to actually look, archive and study such interventions and involvement. For within them we may find appropriate indigenous, popular medicines for violent conflict that have been lost or forgotten, smothered by the state-centric paradigm of the recent past. The people of the world need new solutions to violent conflicts, and cities may be a useful addition to our understanding of how to transform the attitudes, behaviour and issues at their heart.■

(14) Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Underdevelopment and Its Remedies'. in Sing Chew and Robert Denemark, ed. *The Underdevelopment of Development*. New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1999, pg. 361.

INTERVIEW WITH DR. GERD JUNNE

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Interviewed by Dr. Bruce Stanley,
Research Fellow at RCCP

Dr. Junne is also Director of The Network University (TNU), offering on-line courses in Conflict Resolution [www.netuni.nl], and was one of the founders of the Amsterdam Centre for Conflict Studies (ACCS). TNU offers courses on 'Transforming Civil Conflict', 'Gender and Conflict Transformation' [which looks at the changing role of women in conflict and post-conflict], and 'Youth and Conflict Transformation'. His most recent research has examined post-conflict reconstruction, and his most recent book, edited together with Willemijn Verkoren and published by Lynne Rienner, is entitled 'Postconflict Development. Meeting New Challenges'.

1. *What is post-conflict reconstruction, and how does it fit into the broader field of conflict resolution?*

- We are in a phase where more conflicts are moving toward so-called post-conflict reconstruction and rebuilding. Interestingly, 'reconstruction' is a funny term. What to rebuild? What if we build 'new' rather than reconstruct the old landscape? Who is going to decide what to reconstruct? What is the role of outsiders? Such questions are important, since the conflict does not just stop with a signed agreement or cease fire. Rather, it is just that they don't kill each other at the same speed as before. In reality, the conflict is going on as before but has entered a new phase. This is one element, and development theory has to recognize that.

The local community needs to be involved at this phase; they have to sit in the driver's seat. But it is an additional challenge when locals are standing with their backs to each other and struggle who is going to hold the steering wheel! Development theory has not until now taken this aspect of conflict enough into account.

2. *Why must we alter our understandings, and focus on the post-conflict reconstruction phase?*

- Many societies are in this phase, and it is more the rule than the exception. Thinking post-conflict reconstruction is necessary due to the dramatic social conflict that is continuing in these communities. But the 'brain drain' that occurs during conflict and during the post-conflict phase has a profound effect on the potential for development. This brain-drain is not just the traditional form, where many elites have fled. It also includes the fact that the young people have not gone to school, and are not prepared to just pick up from where they were before. In places like Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Liberia, for example, there has been a gap in education of ten years. There are some exceptions, like Rwanda, where school enrolment has resumed, and is now higher than in 1995.

3. *How do cities and post-conflict reconstruction issues interact?*

- For cities, their conflicts and its development during the post-conflict reconstruction phase occurs in different ways. What type of conflict it was shapes the post-conflict phase: was the city a capital city and the focus for national takeover? Then it was the focus for capture and destruction during the armed conflict phase. Beirut comes to mind. But if it was a secessionist conflict, then the capital was probably not destroyed, though it may have been bombed. The regional capitals are the ones destroyed, and Grozny is an example here.

During the post-conflict reconstruction phase, the differences of cities also appear. A key one is the diaspora problem, when the diaspora that was a result of the conflict ends up contributing to long distance nationalism and thus to keeping the conflict going well into the post-conflict reconstruction phase. Yet, new waves of diaspora can change the old diaspora, giving it new purpose, or an identity they didn't have before. If there is an economic diaspora, they have less reason to go home. There is of course uncertainty over legal titles, for example, back in their home cities, new arrivals in the city properties, and often ten years of rights have accumulated. One has only to think of the issues in Mosul with the Kurds, Arabs and Turkmans to see that if such issues are not settled or resolved, both old and new instabilities will arise. Both the old and new inhabitants may be unwilling to invest in the city, letting its built environment stagnate.

4. *If we look at the production facilities located in cities, and what happens to them during the post-conflict reconstruction phase, we see that it is hard to put them back into global-level production. Meat factories in the former Yugoslavia were used to process bodies. How easy is it to resume the production of soup again after that?*

- Another issue is that of security during post-conflict reconstruction. Weapons and ammunition are part of the urban fabric in this phase. Many of the young soldiers are demobilized in the city, knowing only how to shoot and grab. The criminal structure of the cities that built up over the conflict gets involved in the process of foreign direct investment (FDI) and humanitarian relief, creating a new source of insecurity. Smuggling is a related issue: during the violence period, the government itself may have also been involved in smuggling or used these networks. In the post-conflict phase, both criminal and state structures remain caught up, unwilling and unable to change. Both local and FDI are reluctant to invest, leaving the criminal elements as often the only ones that have money. Then, if the government privatizes state assets in the city, the criminals are the only ones able to buy them.

5. *Such structures perpetuate patron/client relationships which make it very hard to establish democracy in such a situation. The lack of investment helps maintain the unemployment, leading to the potential for the reoccurrence of the conflict, especially among young males. If we look at the cities just between Marrakesh and Kabul, there could be over 150m young males unemployed: what is to be done for them?*

- Another issue for cities and post-conflict reconstruction is that of the role of international organizations (IOs). They often create an aid economy during this phase, and we don't yet know the long term impact of this. The humanitarian relief goes primarily to urban areas, with its related corruption and problems. As mentioned above, there will be an additional brain drain, but this is one where those post-secondary school graduates go to work for the IOs. This often kills local civil society organizations, which are decapitated by such shifts. The projects started also directly encourage a shift in local career patterns, and in developmental priorities and in regions receiving attention. All this transforms the development geography. In addition, local municipal leaders want IOs to stay, but other factions may want them out. This tension may spill over into development projects.

The aid economy which emerges in the post-conflict reconstruction phase distorts as well because many projects are not geared to local circumstances. Local staff are not consulted, as was the case in Sarajevo. Locals are often brought in to implement, not to question the post-conflict reconstruction targets. Likewise, the locals employed are often from academic or professional backgrounds, such as economist, lawyers and technically skilled people. These groups are the ones stimulated to look elsewhere outside their communities after the IOs leave. They are the ones locally who can grab opportunities, have developed new skills. In fact, often local employers don't want to employ them, since they have been 'spoiled' for local employment. Therefore, after the first wave of emigration in the post-conflict reconstruction phase, there is usually a second wave of brain drain four to five years later.

During the post-conflict reconstruction phase, other types of issues concerning cities also arise. For example, employment projects are more visible in cities, and thus are usually focused there. The rural areas feel neglected, and resentment builds. In conflict, huge migration to cities occurs, and the post-conflict reconstruction phase must address the clash of cultures between new urban citizens and the old urban citizens. Given the large numbers of new immigrants, there are problems of blocking participation during elections by those older inhabitants of the city; thus a new round of resentment and unrest can arise.

6. *How successful is all the energy and funds that flow into post-conflict reconstruction?*

- We must recognize that during the post-conflict

reconstruction phase there is the potential for over 50% of conflicts to return to violence. Conflicts are not settled, and many international donors and NGOs will wait to become involved. Ironically, the international community often wants to demonize some of the parties, and this may contradict or inhibit many of the local processes for smoothing over conflict. Many victims see that those who profit during the post-conflict reconstruction phase are the very perpetrators of the conflict. The privileged are promoted, and those victims, weak before, become victims again during the post-conflict reconstruction phase.

One of my concerns is to help us understand that, just as we know that the conflict period has victims and winners, so to the post-conflict reconstruction phase also has its winners and victims. Often they are identical in both periods.

Too often, the process of reconciliation remains at a minimal level during this phase, with attention placed on hardware and project spending. There is often a lack of common projects that transcend boundaries and communities, and there are few functional projects. It is often dialogue only that is pushed by the IOs in such circumstances.

7. *Given all these problems, it sounds as if you may think outsiders should not venture into cities in the post-conflict reconstruction phase?*

- Certainly, the threshold for going in should be high. The intervention should be a short one, since the negative effects of intervention multiply over time. Yet there will always be those who suggest that outside agencies did not stay long enough. Ultimately, you are damned if you do and damned if you don't. There is a narrow path to achieve what you have gone in to accomplish while not accumulating or exacerbating problems. Many groups will see interveners as assets to be plundered, or the internal market structure will be changed or destroyed by the intervention. One must be very careful and aware.

8. *Where do we go from here in our thinking about post-conflict reconstruction?*

- We have a long way to go to understand post-conflict reconstruction. There are few rules or blueprints. Rather, we are seeing the pitfalls now, the problems that can occur. We must test again and again our understandings, and apply our new lessons. In the process, we have a key problem: those who intervene have limited information about local networks and the communities they enter. The view you start with from the outside is very different than when you are there and on the ground. Once on the ground, you find local NGOs that are really fronts for criminal gangs, for example. Finding out who is the first step of understanding. The early framing of the conflict is crucial, since it becomes continuous. Thus, how we 'read' local behaviour doesn't mean we believe it, and must be constantly re-evaluated. ■

THE 'JULY WAR' ON LEBANON: HOPEFUL PROSPECTS

Samir Khalaf*

Lebanon's encounters with collective strife - from the peasant uprisings and communal conflict in the nineteenth century, the sectarian massacres of 1860, the limited civil war of 1958 and the latest two decades of protracted violence - are anomalous, if not bizarre. At least they depart markedly from other comparable instances of collective unrest. The sources, which initiate and sustain the hostility, are not always coherent. Indeed, circumstances that spark the conflict and those which sustain it are entirely different. In this sense, violence acquires a life of its own which is often totally unrelated to the initial causes. More peculiar, perhaps, recurrent episodes of belligerent fighting are never resolved by a recognized victor or vanquished. Hence the issues underlying hostility are rarely alleviated or addressed. It is in this sense that wars, despite the massive destruction and anguish they generate, remain futile, costly and ugly. In Lebanon such peculiarities are further compounded by other aberrant features which reduce the country into a battlefield for other people's wars. It is in this profound sense that Lebanon often degenerates into a proxy war zone or a surrogate victim of the unresolved regional and global rivalries which beset the region. It is also in this sense that Lebanon is perhaps one of the rare countries in the world which neither wills its entry or exit from war.

The so-called 'July War' on Lebanon, and historians in due course will most probably coin a more fitting term for it, has already reconfirmed many of these peculiar features. A fairly innocuous but confrontational episode - Hizbullah's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and its ambush of an Israeli brigade which came for their rescue, incited a disproportionate Israeli reprisal. What was intended as a limited and quick military incursion to capture Nasrallah was transformed into a 34-day spectacle of dazzling warfare? The initial objective of eradicating or neutralizing Hizbullah turned into an all-out war to devastate and punish Lebanon. Indeed, what was at stake is not just the destruction of life and property, immense as they turned out to be. The very existence of an entire country seemed in jeopardy. A spiteful three-pronged blockade (air, sea and ground) was tightly imposed on the entire country. The bulk of Lebanon's infrastructure - bridges, roadways, public amenities - are now in ruin. Its vital crops, agricultural resources, vibrant commercial services and retail trade are suffering fatal setbacks. Its bucolic shoreline, maritime industry, colorful entertainment and venues for popular culture, the mainstays of its tourist industry, have been also damaged. Most disheartening, perhaps, were the diplomatic and internal squabbles over the terms and mandate of the UN Security Council Resolution (1701). The delays did much to undermine spirits of confidence and reassurance urgently needed to shore up

collective enthusiasm for Lebanon's early recovery and rehabilitation.

It is magnitude and nature of human suffering which stand out, however, as the most atrocious and grotesque. Certainly, the hackneyed epithets of Lebanon as a 'quagmire' or a 'proxy battle field' are not hideous enough to truly describe the poignant suffering of innocent citizens. By any comparable measure, the harrowing chain of events which beleaguered those trapped in the crossfire, particularly the sheer trauma of relentless air assaults are truly stupefying. The besieged victims had to suffer countless visitations and indignities: witnessing the violated and disfigured human flesh of their loved ones before their own eyes, fleeing their homes hastily as commanded by Israeli leaflets, face all the discomforts of dislocation thus becoming refugees in unfamiliar settings, then returning to take stock of their devastated homes and neighborhood and, above all, coping with the anguish and grief of burying their dead in faceless rows of collective graves. The immeasurable pain and destruction is even more acute because this needless war - preplanned or otherwise - erupted at a time when the country was displaying some auspicious signs of recovery and solidarity.

But such accounts of the war, journalistic or otherwise, are legion. Rather than provide yet another backdrop of the circumstances leading to the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers on July 12, or a blow by blow narration of the sudden and relentless onslaught, I will instead make an effort to extract a few positive inferences from this very unusual encounter with warfare. Despite all the untold horrors of the 'July War', a few portends are surfacing to presage some hopeful prospects. At least five such glimmers are discernable.

The Futility of Militarism

Although this recent instance of massive violence shares much with earlier episodes, it departs in at least one compelling way from its antecedents. This is the first time that the major combatants, let alone their sponsors, have begun to realize the ultimate futility and impotence of war; inherent in both the zealotry of a militant resistance movement and the advanced war technology of one of the most militarized states. Hizbullah could have continued to lob the tens of thousands of rockets at its disposal and Israel likewise could have leveled the country with its supersonic jets without much consequence other than intensifying the magnitude of enmity. For once, in other words, diplomacy, non-belligerent dialogue, bona fide

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negotiation are given a chance. Judging by the surge of genuine sympathy the war has aroused in the moral consciousness of world powers, this is not just another elusive pipe dream.

The Lebanonization of Hizbullah

Another hopeful byproduct of the war is the likelihood of the 'Lebanonization' of Hizbullah; namely, the testy prospects of converting a radicalized resistance movement into a non-combative voluntary association or civic-minded political party with undivided national allegiance and commitment to safeguard Lebanon's sovereignty and independence is bound to be testy. This is not going to be easy given its 'honorable' combat conduct in foiling Israel's cocksure expectations of walking away with yet another military bonanza. The feat is more than just 'honorable'. It has, after all, humiliated one of the most militarized societies. Israel expends up to \$11 billion on its military budget (close to 15% of its GNP) equipped with the latest high-tech anti-rocket laser technologies (Patriot and Nautilus), yet it could not, in over two weeks of intense fighting subdue around 50 armed militants in Bint-Jbeil.

Despite the exultant and triumphal reception of Hizbullah's accomplishment throughout the Arab and Muslim world, attributed by Nasrallah 'as an unprecedented historic and logistical victory', one can depict a perceptible change in his outward message and tone. Gone are the early defiant, overconfident, even brash rhetoric. He now seems measured, more accommodating, reconciliatory, even deceptively cool.

It is somewhat ironic here to compare the addresses of Nasrallah and Prime Minister Olmert. For a few moments the tables were turned on the public images imputed to both. Without his turban, Nasrallah had the demeanor and tone of a professor or CEO addressing a university seminar or a corporate boardroom. Olmert's frantic presentation and the raving hecklers in the Knesset, in sharp contrast, assumed all the contrived images of an 'Arabized' oriental setting.

Perhaps because of the immensity of the human toll of suffering and destruction the war has already generated, Hizbullah might not be able to translate its Pyrrhic victory on the battlefield into demonstrable political capital. Hizbullah's ministers voted in favor of the UN ceasefire resolution and agreed to deploy 15000 troops of the Lebanese army. They also voted for the seven-point document the government presented at the Security Council. Nasrallah himself has expressed gratitude for how well the overflows of displaced Shiites have been received in other communities. Hizbullah's impressive pre-war record in areas of welfare and in attending to the socio-cultural, educational, public health and other basic human needs of its rapidly growing constituencies could be judiciously reinforced in pronouncing the non-militant mainstay of its activities.

Arguably, it is far from facile to 'tame' a paramilitary organization sparked by a divine passion for martyrdom. Yet it is quite possible to recycle some of its secular and pragmatic resources. Part of Hizbullah's 'success story' is inherent in its organizational skills, ability to identify the real needs of its constituencies and mobilize a network of focused, committed and quietly diligent core of devotees. Just a day after the cease-fire, the party was already issuing compensations, in cash, for residents needing to rent alternative houses for at least a year until their destroyed houses are rebuilt.

In other words, rather than being decried and feared, Hizbullah's arms and fighting effectiveness could be readily institutionalized into the country's frail and faint-hearted army. Indeed, such a strategy could become the linchpin for its reintegration into the emergent political system. This and other such subtle strategies for the 'Lebanonization' of Hizbullah are urgent and should be prioritized; at least to avert their predispositions to seek added external patronage in the direction of the Iranian/Syrian axis. Both seem more than eager to exploit the momentous 'success' of Hizbullah for their own strategic and bargaining purposes.

Lebanese Resilience

The proverbial resilience of the Lebanese to cope with adversity has once again come to their rescue. This adaptive cultural proclivity to 'normalize' the deadly episodes of war and to transform them into ordinary routines is enhanced by their earlier survival of twenty years factional strife. One sees this is the resigned *déjà vu* attitude of the older generation who are keen not to disrupt their habitual everyday life. Younger groups, too young to recollect the atrocities of war their parents suffered, are galvanized instead by a sense of outrage, despair and defeat. More so since they are still buoyed by the enthusiasm sparked by their participation in the Spring 2005 uprising. No wonder that the sudden and unforeseen relapse of their country into yet another cycle of proxy wars is seen as a profound existential setback. To allay their despair and restore their personal dignity and self-worth, they have immersed themselves in the voluntarism of advocacy groups; particularly relief and rescue operations and hands-on outreach programs to address the rehabilitative needs of the displaced. It is uplifting to see evidence of their fearless and selfless involvement.

Those too young to hazard such challenging ventures sought their own expressive outlets: variety shows and spontaneous entertainment activities, makeshift day centers and camps, candlelight vigils in Martyrs' Square as a tribute to the fallen victims. In no time, over a dozen informative websites were established to disseminate and exchange special write-ups, opinions and editorials on the unfolding events of the war. A new group, the Civil Campaign for Relief (CCR), a coalition of all existing voluntary associations, was created to assess the relief

needs and formulate appropriate rehabilitative strategies. Renowned artists, celebrities, the entertainment industry launched special campaigns and appeals for funds. Already a score of rousing songs and video clips, with poignant imagery depicting the agonies and glories of resistance, have been released. More substantive are the contributions and promises of prominent public figures to rebuild destroyed bridges and major roadways. Altogether such direct involvement offers a rare grounded tutelage in civic mindedness and collective consciousness. These, too, will come handy in the impending post-war period.

Humanitarian Solidarity

Equally impressive, are the symptoms of fraternity, compassion and benevolence with which the displaced refugees have been received by their co-religionists. Christian convents, schools, hospitals (much like other communities), have shown no reluctance in opening their premises to accommodate swarms of uprooted refugees without any visible friction or symptoms of intolerance. Some associations have already launched rehabilitative programs to cope with the post-traumatic stress symptoms of displaced and war-weary groups. Such manifestation of fraternity bodes well for future prospects of co-existence and national solidarity. Groups who had no direct contacts or any joint interaction before, or who have had only vicarious or mediated knowledge of each other, have experienced now circumstances, brief as they were, to interact directly and face-to-face with the 'other'. Both communities came to realize that they have much to share; at least that they are not the 'demons' contrived by years of forced isolation and social distance.

The Role of the Media

Another unanticipated positive fallout of the 'July war' is the inventive role of the media, foreign and indigenous alike, in relaying the unfolding episodes of the fighting. For over a month the events in Lebanon, for 24 hours a day became the uncontested prime item of news. The hazards front-line journalists risked in chronicling the cruelties of war from such a close and intimate range was truly admirable; often heroic. As a result, the instant graphic imagery, gripping narrations and soul-searching discourses of ordinary citizens caught up in its maelstrom, relayed to the rest of the world, left compelling heart-rending messages. These are bound to make a difference in the way Lebanon is perceived. Already, the images have sharpened global awareness of the cruelties of proxy wars and the victimization of innocent children, women and the aged; too old or too destitute to flee the battle zones. In some respects, the psychological traumas induced by such cruelties, precisely because they are protracted and displaced, might well be more anguishing in the long run than the short-lived memories of a 9/11 or a tsunami.

The liberal, free-for-all context of the Lebanese media

was a windfall to eager news-hungry journalists. They came in droves like fearless daredevils and adventurous thrill-seekers. Nothing was off-bound to them. The outcome is some truly spell-bounding images and vivid newscast which merit a Pulitzer Prize or other distinguished awards. This is also, for a change, in stark contrast to the Israeli coverage of the war. Whereas the media in Israel was subject to stringent censorship, local and foreign, journalists in Lebanon were free to roam all fronts and cover all dimensions of the war; the bestial and the humane, the wanton assaults of Israeli planes and the agony and fortitude of its luckless victims. This unsanitized and unstaged depiction of the war awakened, as in no other time, the consciousness and outrage of the world. Kofi Annan could not restrain himself from berating the Security Council for taking its time in ending the carnage. It is this moral outrage, and it could not be dramatized enough, which unleashed the cornucopia of donations and bequests in support of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Doubtlessly, this must have also prodded the growing number of countries to confirm their participation in the international peacekeeping force. ■

JERUSALEM: THE LOST CITY THE IMPACT OF THE ISRAELI TERRITORIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC POLICIES ON JERUSALEM AND ITS 'PALESTINIAN RESIDENTS'

Rami Nasrallah*

Until June 4th, 1967, the jurisdiction of the East Jerusalem municipality had an area of 6.5 km². On June 28th, 1967, the Israeli Knesset passed a law that formally extends Israeli laws, jurisdiction, and civil administration over 70 km² of Arab East Jerusalem and the lands of 28 surrounding West Bank villages.

The new borders brought a large cordon of mostly uninhabited land on the fringes of the city. Ever since, intensive rings of settlements were built. Israel conducted a census which classified Palestinians as 'permanent residents whom entered Israel according to the entry law of 1951'. Jerusalemites who were not recorded due to their travel (many Palestinians worked in the Gulf countries, and the war broke before their return to summer vacation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem), were classified as absentees and had no right to return back into their city.

In addition to these formal political-legal acts, Israel set in motion a series of policies to 'create facts on the ground'. As means of establishing a strong Jewish physical presence over all of East Jerusalem, a massive program of Jewish settlement was carried out beyond the pre-1967 dividing line and the Israeli authorities tried to maintain and enlarge the Jewish demographic majority by encouraging Jews to settle in Jerusalem, while at the same time restricting the Palestinian growth in the annexed areas of East Jerusalem.

Following the geopolitical act of annexing East Jerusalem, the Israeli government confiscated more than 24,000 dunams (34% of East Jerusalem territories) of Palestinian land for building new Jewish settlements. In addition, 37,000 dunams of Palestinian private owned lands were designated 'green areas' or 'unplanned' through zoning ordinances. Municipal borders of Jerusalem were designed based on military and political consideration. Jerusalem became the largest 'Israeli' city with an area of 108.3 m². The annexed East Jerusalem became a site for mass construction of Jewish settlements, which meant to make the division of the city impossible and 'guaranteed' territorial and demographic domination. Between 1967 and the eighties Israel built 9 settlements. First settlements linked West Jerusalem with the former Jewish enclave on Mount Scopus. Later on, four major settlements were built in the northeast, northwest, southeast and Southwest. In the 80s and 90s, the settlements built were to complete the inner belt of settlement surrounding the Old City and cut the Palestinian neighborhoods' contiguity. In addition to building settlements, Israel re-allocated security control and government Institutions in a new compound in Sheikh Jarrah area.

Israeli Government's Policies

The demographic balance served - since the beginning of occupation until today - as the main consideration in the Israeli decision making on the government level and on the local level of the city.

Following the occupation and the annexation act, 68.6 thousands Palestinians were recorded as residents of Jerusalem. In 1967 the Palestinian population constituted 25.8% of the total population of Jerusalem. To examine Jerusalem's development, in 1973, the Israeli government adopted the intra-ministerial committee which recommended to preserve the proportion of Palestinians to Jews as existed in the end of 1972; 73.3% Jews and 25.5% Palestinians.

The Israeli policies were limited and directed to mainly serve spatial/ demographic domination of Jewish Jerusalem. No minimal effort was invested to 'integrate' the Palestinian neighborhoods' functions with West Jerusalem or the settlements built in Palestinian areas, on the contrary, the policy was to separate and isolate them.

The Israeli government 'allowed' certain autonomy of Palestinian Jerusalemites especially in education, sport, health, culture, religious institutions and community based organizations. East Jerusalem continued to serve as a metropolitan center of the entire West Bank and this enhanced the 'autonomy' of Jerusalemites and created an alternative separate system.

The Israeli government policies revolved around the 'unity of Jerusalem' until Camp David II negotiations, where demographic consideration became the reason for the 'getting rid' of the Palestinian demographic threat after they had accomplished the spacio-political goals of Jewish Jerusalem.

Green is a neutral planning and a partisan

Open space, colored dark or light green, on the municipality maps is a space where construction is totally forbidden. In a neutral planning system this regulation is to protect greenery and urban open spaces on the neighborhood and regional levels. In East Jerusalem's case, this regulation is to restrict Palestinian development and to isolate to 'protect' the Israeli settlements.

Wide exaggerated belts of open space 'green areas' are imposed on East Jerusalem. Such zones are a great fear for Palestinians who intend to build a home and find that their hopes are painted green on the mayors table.

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It is worth mentioning that these green areas that are the only reserved lands for future Palestinian development; are in most cases not agricultural, barren, and rocky.

As a result, Palestinian land owners have developed individual survival initiatives with small scale contractors, without physical plans, or incentives of the central and local government, with limited financial, technical, and administrative resources. The experience shows that these 'green' areas are used as a 'reserve' serving later the expansion of East Jerusalem settlements.

As a result of the above policy, Palestinian neighborhoods (including the available land for future development) consists only 17% of entire East Jerusalem area; 7% of total municipal Jerusalem. Israel imposed a restricted policy on Palestinian construction and economic development, which led to the emigration of the Palestinians from the city to new areas developed as suburbs of the city. This territorial/demographic domination and restriction on Palestinian development affected East Jerusalem deteriorating its functionality by disconnecting it from its hinterland and West Bank areas.

Physical and social fragmentation of the city, is associated with the weak role of the private sector, civil society and grassroots organizations in shaping the social needs of the Palestinian residents; this resulted in an absence of the communities' role in expressing their needs.

Before 1996, Palestinians who lived abroad for more than 7 years lost their residency rights. Ever since 1996, Israel applied a new policy of 'center of life' which defined further Palestinian residency rights. Under this policy, Palestinians are subject to losing their right to reside in Jerusalem if they fail to prove that municipal Jerusalem is their 'center of life'; that is, they work, live and send their children to schools within the city boundaries. Israel began to confiscate the Israeli ID cards of Palestinians that have been living in the suburbs outside the municipal boundaries. These suburbs had developed since the mid-eighties and had become an integral part of the city. Loss of Israeli ID cards means denying access to the city. Accordingly, thousands of Palestinian Jerusalemites panicked and returned to the city: a process that increased the city's housing problems and hard conditions.

With the construction of the fragmentation wall in 2003, more Palestinian Jerusalemites moved back to the city also increasing the phenomenon of illegal building. Building permits for some buildings allow building in less than 50% of the parcels' area, yet people built 4-6 times more than the permitted percentage. Other buildings are built in open or green areas excluded from planning schemes.

Despite the fact that houses built in green areas are subject to demolition and have no services, people still risk their investment and prefer to live in fear and hard conditions

rather than lose their right to reside in Jerusalem.

The Fragmentation Wall

The wall has a dramatic impact on the future of Jerusalem and its surroundings. It is the most significant change to the city since its occupation in 1967. It radically affects the boundaries of the city and metropolitan area, the movement and placement of the Palestinian population, and eliminates the centrality the city has for all Palestinians.

The route of the wall:

The first phase of the wall was a northwestern West Bank barrier. Later began the construction of the 'Jerusalem Envelop'. The plans initially included a 22-kilometer barrier around East Jerusalem which was completed in July 2003 and comprised of two segments: one in the north of the city separating East Jerusalem from Samiramis and Kafr Aqab (Jerusalem neighborhoods of approx. 12,000 people) and Ramallah, and the other in the south of the city separating it from Bethlehem.

In August 2003, the Israeli Government approved a 64-km wall to isolate Jerusalem along the eastern borders of the Israeli annexed East Jerusalem in 1967. Construction of a 17 km segment began from the south in early October 2003. The second segment extended northwards to exclude Shurfat Refugee Camp, Ras Khamis and Dhahiyat As-Salam neighborhoods from East Jerusalem, despite them being located within the municipal borders. It continues north then northwest reaching Qalandiya Checkpoint separating the previously vital commercial and service centers serving East Jerusalem; Dahiyat Al Bareed and Ar-Ram (50,000) from East Jerusalem and enclaving them on its way. It also isolates 17,000 residents of Anata, Hizma and Az-Z'ayyem from East Jerusalem and their surroundings.

Another segment consolidates the city's suburban villages of Bir Nabala (an important commercial and industrial axis linked to East Jerusalem), Qalandiya Al-Balad, Al-Judaira, Al-Jeeb and Beit Hanina Al Balad into an isolated enclave cut from East Jerusalem and linked to Ramallah by a tunnel. The total population of these villages is approximately 28,000 residents, half of which carry Jerusalem identity cards. Moreover, Al-Walajah village southwest of Jerusalem will be transformed into an isolated area. Part of this village is located within the borders of East Jerusalem. A twenty-five kilometer wall circumscribes the two enclaves.

Additional segments include a wall from the east of Ma'ale Adumim settlement and the areas surrounding it to Jerusalem.

Effects of the Wall

1. The Palestinian Siege vis-à-vis the Israeli de facto new annexation

The notion of the Israeli territorial control through the annexation of settlements in greater Jerusalem is enjoying a political consensus of both left and right wing in Israel. The wall route excludes areas of future development for Palestinian neighborhoods in and around Jerusalem and enclaves them.

- Building the wall redraws the borders of the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality and the open areas under its direct jurisdiction. The wall annexes to the Israeli settlements within the municipal boundaries, more than 4,000 dunams (1,000 acres), and excludes 3,200 dunams (800 acres) of established Palestinian neighborhoods within the boundaries of East Jerusalem from the city.
- Construction of the wall annexes vast areas of occupied Palestinian lands on which Israeli settlements have been built outside Jerusalem's municipal borders.
- The wall allows Jewish West Jerusalem to annex several outlying Israeli settlements. Such settlements represent parts of neighborhoods originally established within the Green Line borders of 1967 but, over time, their development spread to occupied Palestinian territory.
- The wall places outside the city borders 40,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites who presently live within the city, separating them from the city and from the crucial public and personal services provided in it. In addition, 60,000 to 90,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites presently living in the Jerusalem Governorate areas that surround East Jerusalem will be isolated from the city. This effectively reduces the percentage of the Palestinians in the total population of the Jerusalem Municipality (East and West), which reached 34% in 2004. The remaining Palestinian areas that lie within the wall will be inhabited by no more than 50% of the actual Palestinian Jerusalemite population and their percentage in the total municipal population will shrink to a mere 20%.

2. The Effects of the Wall on the Functioning of East Jerusalem as a Metropolitan Center

- The city's relationship to the West Bank and its hinterland. For centuries Jerusalem had functioned as the central Palestinian city for all of the West Bank and a major intersection and destination in itself for hundreds of thousands of West Bankers. That role received a huge blow by Israeli decisions in the 1990's to bar entry to the city to holders of West Bank identity cards. The policy, which began by the creation of entry checkpoints, ID card requirements, and periodic closures, culminates with the erection of the Jerusalem Envelop wall. Collectively, these measures have marginalized East Jerusalem's influence as a Palestinian metropolis: it is no longer a place to shop, pray, or receive such basic services as healthcare and education. Indeed, East Jerusalem and its cultural and economic standing have been so diminished that it is no longer the institutional, commercial, service, religious and functional center for the West Bank. This has been equally right for the surroundings of the city where its link to its suburbs

has been severed weakening the city and isolating it from its contiguous J2 Palestinian communities.

- The fragmentation and decline of the city. The wall creates new 'facts on the ground' that increase the fragmentation of Jerusalem neighborhoods. It fractures its functional integrity and severs the urban continuity with its natural expansion and potential development areas. All lands that can be allocated for Palestinian development and construction in the city will lie outside the wall. This means that there cannot be new neighborhoods in East Jerusalem to accommodate its residents. In fact, the wall accelerated the transformation of the city's neighborhoods into high-density poverty slums, which will lead to the sociological and economic degradation of large groups of city residents.
- The enhancement of Israeli West Jerusalem. The wall enhances West Jerusalem as an Israeli metropolis. Since the end of the 1990's Israel has intensified this process by establishing an infrastructure of roads, tunnels, bridges and settlement by-pass routes that reduce distances between the settlements and West Jerusalem and strengthen the linkage of the settlements with the Jewish capital. This created two road systems; a modern developed system that has contributed to the development of Jerusalem's Jewish settlements, and another old network that the winding wall has transformed into a disjointed collection of dead end roads that are used only by the Palestinian side.

The new reality imposed by the wall and the disruptive Israeli infrastructure undermine the possibility of ever restoring Palestinian centrality to East Jerusalem and significantly, if not entirely, deny its potential to serve in the future as the capital of a Palestinian state. Further, the wall ends the role of the secondary centers linked with Jerusalem, especially Ar-Ram and Bir Nabala to the north and Al-Ezarieh to the east. These communities were essential extensions and 'interaction meeting zones' that allowed contact between Jerusalemites and residents of West Bank areas and abetted a sense of Palestinian unity and identity. These secondary centers are now artificially oriented towards Ramallah and Bethlehem, even though they do not have a strong functional relationship with them.

Finally, the present route of the wall and its direct impact cast serious doubt on the central Israeli rationalization for the wall--security. The level of Israeli control represented by the magnitude of the wall, the quantity of land it consumes, the mass of the Palestinian population it constrains, and its linkage to geographic and functional space issues, all combine to argue that the goal is much more ambitious than simple security. Seen in the broader and earlier context of land confiscations, home demolitions, closures, road blocks, and check points, the wall is best understood as but the crowning phase of an integrated system of fragmentation, separation, control, and expropriation that has been proceeding for many years. ■

ALONG THE BORDERS OF THE 'ALBANIAN QUESTION': NATIONALISM AND CITY NETWORKS

Francesco Strazzari*

The national question in the Balkan region is far from settled. As late as 2006 the independence of Montenegro, the difficult negotiations over the status of Kosovo, as well as the disputes on domestic arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina and inside the Republic of Macedonia all illustrate how national identities, sovereignties and borders are still on the move, and how the existence of an 'Albanian question' plays a critical role in these dynamics.

Mediatic accounts and scholarly literature on the Balkan wars have paid significant attention to urbicidal practices, which are epitomized by the 1,000-day-long siege of Sarajevo. In spite of this, the *longue durée* nexus 'urban base - nationalism - conflict' remains somehow in the shadow. Given this, one might be induced to think that the study of the transformation of the urban landscape is not critical for addressing the structural transformation of conflict dynamics. In this article I claim that the opposite is true.

I. Borders and boundaries

The 'Albanian question' has to do with the trajectory of the modern nation-state: Albanian nationalism portrays it as stemming from arbitrary borders that divide an area inhabited by growing Albanian communities, exposing them to minority status and economic underdevelopment.

Aside from the violent parabola of Kosovo in the late '90s, instability in the Albanian-speaking region became quite visible in 1997, when the Republic of Albania was swept by a wave of panic triggered by a sequence of financial scandals, and state structures crumbled in a scenario of quasi-civil war. While peaks of tension have punctuated Albanian-Greek relations, and nationalism among Albanians from Montenegro has kept a relatively low profile, in Serbian areas bordering on Kosovo an offspring of the Kosovo Liberation Army (Uçk) embarked on a violent campaign between 2000 and 2001. The Western cities of the Republic of Macedonia have known sporadic episodes of violence throughout the 1990s, and a militarized escalation in the spring of 2001, in whose wake the basis of the coexistence between ethnic Macedonians and the sizable Albanian minority had to be seriously reconsidered.

The Albanian-speaking region is a peripheral area that stretches across high mountains and thick borders. The fact that it exhibits the typical traits of a periphery (Michel Roux defined Kosovo 'une véritable périphérie de la

périphérie') should in no way induce to neglect. War winds originating from the Southeast European region have swept the world arena throughout the 20th century. The long memory of the past century speaks of the relatively short fuse and the long-range international consequences of the conflicts that sweep Europe's Southeastern flank. Besides the Dayton agreement for Bosnia, the UNMIK administration in Kosovo, and the Ohrid agreements in the Republic of Macedonia all speak of the commitment of the international community to this turbulent area.

II. The nation and the territory

The aim of the guerrillas group that have mushroomed in the region has been the ignition of a number of foci, whose flaring up and soldering was meant to open a generalized, transborder 'Albanian question' by agitating the specter of pan-Albanian nationalism and 'Greater Albania', thereby prompting external powers to intervene and modify the existing geopolitical order.

In its historical development, Albanian nationalism emerges as the product of circles of intellectual emigrés, and it enters the scene relatively late, if compared with other Balkan nations. After the independence gained in the light of the Balkan wars (1913), Tirana was designated as the capital (1920), and it was only in 1957 that the first Albanian university was opened with the help of Soviet sponsors. 'Mythistorical' constructs were transmitted from Tirana to the University of Prishtinë (a product of the autonomy that Kosovo Albanians conquered in Yugoslavia). Here the Tosk linguistic standard was adopted with a view to crafting a unified cultural field, in spite of the fact that the population of Kosovo is overwhelmingly Gheg. Unlike Albania, which was locked vis-à-vis the outside world, and pursuing rural retention policies, Yugoslavia was both open to the outside world, and promoting urbanization. The Prishtinë urban experiment sharpened conflict dynamics: among traditional social practices, Western orientation and Enverist calls, the Institute of Albanology licensed wide numbers of unemployed male youths,⁽¹⁾ a prologue to the rebellion of 1981, of which the university was the hotbed.

The typical national constructs coined in this context portray the nation as surrounded by Slavic and Greek oppressors. The traditional nationalist script points the

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(1) Sources differ in estimates, but approximately 40,000 students would have been enrolled. See Marco Dogo, *Albanesi e Serbi, Le radici del Conflitto* (Cosenza, Marco editore, 1997)

finger on boundaries, and on the reiterated failure to bring the 'Albanian question' to the table of great power diplomacy in such a way that justice could be made in drawing borders. In the nationalist cliché, all territories with a consolidated Albanian presence are portrayed as being Albania, political divisions being sheer historical circumstance.

The archetypical motifs of pan-Albanianism hark back to 1878, when the Great Powers decided over Balkan borders, and the Albanians put together the League of Prizren. Nationalism celebrates the rallying of men in arms around a fight that swept the whole Albanian-speaking region. The idea of territorial mutilation finds reverberations in a plethora of nationalist blueprints and speeches that have characterized the most turbulent phases of recent regional history. When the Yugoslav federative structures were faltering, a coordinating body of all Albanian parties from Yugoslavia elaborated a blueprint referring to self-determination and to Albanian 'ethnic territories'.

III. Changing landscapes

In and around the 'Albanian question' multiple tracks of external assistance, facilitation and intervention take the shape of great power diplomacy, conflict resolution initiatives, and regional integration.⁽²⁾ The EU has been operating in the Western Balkans through the instruments of its 'Stabilization and Association Process', in which decentralization measures are designed to play a role that challenges centralized nation-state practices.

On the other hand, Albanian-speaking regions are no longer predominantly rural: people have been leaving mountains and even remote towns and cities to move towards the booming urban settings of the center, or to go abroad. These changes take place notwithstanding national ideology still celebrates the image of a pristine, uniform territory patrolled by patriotic-patriarchal men, and it often enacts violent strategies that aim at the obliteration of time.⁽³⁾

Following Raymen Pearson, I hypothesize that the process of growth and transformation of the urban landscape (the city and city networks in a global space) can be regarded as a stage of maturation of nationalism in its reference to territory.⁽⁴⁾ I contend that the rapid transformation of territory in a peripheral region of the global economy does affect the nationalist script, and the stimuli and constraints set by a supranational external actor (e.g., the EU) may play a significant role in determining the outcome.

IV. The urban boom

The Albanian flag was first hoisted in Vlorë by a handful

of patriots in 1912, but when the Great Powers designed the Prince of Wied to the throne of Albania, he found it impossible to rule the country. Entrenched in Durrës, he eventually gave up. At that time traveling even inside Albania was extremely difficult. Patriots describe the trip from Tirana to Durrës as an adventure that would last 2 days amidst all possible dangers, and in absence of a road. In reflecting on the sources of backwardness, a report by the British Intelligence during WWI stated that the very term 'road' in the Albanian context was meant to express simply the concept of direction, because the itineraries to be followed between two points would depend on circumstances that were beyond control.⁽⁶⁾

At the time of the Austrian census of 1919, 12% of the Albanian population was registered as urban, and Tirana had a population of 10,000.⁽⁷⁾ The first census conducted by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1921 indicate a population of 14,290 for Prishtinë.⁽⁸⁾ At the outbreak of WWII, Tirana had 25,000 inhabitants. On the eve of the fall of the Socialist regime, the population was 240,000 - thus exhibiting a tenfold growth.⁽⁹⁾ This figure is doubled after 15 years of post-socialist transition: Tirana in 2005 counted some official 586,000 inhabitants, while other estimates for 2006 are as high as 700-750,000.

While Tirana has been receiving a seemingly unending rural exodus, Prishtinë has been booming after the war of 1998-1999. Traveling across the Albanian-speaking region today means moving between and across cities of approximately 500-700,000 inhabitants (Tirana, Prishtinë), middle-sized cities of 200-250,000 (Tetovë, Prizren, and Durrës), smaller cities such as Shkodër and Vlorë, and ethnically mixed cities such as Skopje. Along the roads, the territory is punctuated with half-completed houses of recent construction, upon which the Albanian flag often waves. The flag is the same across all borders, one flag for all Albanians.

(3) The way in which initiatives along these tracks can diminish war propensity is discussed systematically by Benjamin Miller ('When and how regions become peaceful: potential theoretical pathways to peace,' *International Studies Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2005).

(4) Ivekovic, Rada, *Autopsie des Balkans*, Ein psycho-politischer Essay (Graz, Droschl, 2001).

(5) In his seminal study on nationalism and minorities in Eastern Europe between 1848 and 1945, Raymen Pearson affirms that 'those nationalities without a city experienced difficulty in developing their nationalism beyond the cultural stage' into a political blueprint (*National Minorities in Eastern Europe, 1848-1945*, McMillan, London, 1984, p. 35).

(6) See Misha, Piro, 'Invention of a nationalism,' in Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie and Bernd J. Fisher (eds.), *Albanian Identities, Myth and History* (London, Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2002), p. 37.

(7) Data from 'The Albanian Census of 1918,' Univ. of Graz: <http://www-gewi.kfunigraz.ac.at/suedost/seiner/>

(8) 'Prethodni Rezultati. Popisa Stanovništva u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata I Slovenaca, 31 Januara 1921, Godine, Sarajevo, Državna štamparija, 1924.

(9) Rugg, Dean, 'Communist Legacies in the Albanian Landscape,' *The Geographical Review*: Vol. 84, pp. 59-73, 1994.

In the case of Kosovo (and Macedonia), the growth of the cities can be partly explained with the effects of war, of externally assisted post-war reconstruction, and of real-estate market mechanisms. International financial institutions have been quite supportive of the construction sector in the case of Albania too,⁽¹⁰⁾ making it by far the first economic sector. Exemplary stories abound. The Kosovar Albanian construction tycoon such Behgjet Paçolli is in control of a veritable empire (Mabetex) headquartered in Switzerland, with interests in South America, the Middle-East, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union (construction of the new Kazakhi capital). Success stories have their dark side: besides Mabetex in Russia, one may recall the Osmani brothers, who controlled construction in Hamburg before ending up arrested.

The wider, long-term picture is one in which Albanian territories are being constructed both materially and socially: the strained, chaotic expansion of cities and road networks speak of these dynamics. The resulting image is highly ambivalent. On one hand, macroscopic stumbling blocks (poor state of the roads, problems that plague urban life) make the idea of horizontal networks in the Albanian-speaking region more a projection than a reality. On the other hand, it is a fact that the described changes have made long-distance traveling across the Albanian-speaking region much easier than it has ever historically been.

V. Toward a new nationalist script?

By the year 1991-92, the disintegration of the Albanian regime and the violent explosion of the Yugoslav federation made thick borders suddenly thin. For most of the 20th century national enmities, and eventually the Cold War rigid overlay, had made all borders impermeable. Now private transportation was becoming available, and borders crossable. Albanians became aware of the yawning social, cultural, economic gaps among themselves by first-hand experience.

This state of things was destined to change quite rapidly, within less than a generation. The winds of transition were moving, and Albanians from Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia all began to move too, from the mountains to the city, and from the city to abroad. The advent of pluri-party systems meant that traditional elites were challenged in their claim to represent the community contingent interests, and allowed new connections with the wider Albanian world.

Although some areas remain hardly accessible, one can travel by car and get from Durrës to Prishtinë via Tirana, Tetovë, and Skopje in approximately 8 hours. Border crossing is no longer prohibitive economic-wise; it is actually needed to generate remittances. A trans-

Albanian business elite is growing, and it operates internationally and globally.

While electricity provision remains spotty to say the least, the spread of digital low-cost communication (satellites, TV, cellular phones, internet) has had a major impact in an intense process of discovery of affinities and differences, and media can now reach an Albanian audience that is wider than the state one. Last but not least, powerful criminal networks act as long and short distance intermediaries, linking one region with another along the routes of gray and black economies, and making their significant geopolitical contribution.⁽¹¹⁾

These dramatic changes describe a situation where the conditions that accompanied the formation of early national ideology no longer apply. The consequences of the process of urbanization are ambivalent. After a first effect astonishment, increased exchange followed, fuelled by an impending sense of danger and opportunity: this sparkled nationalist fervor according to the known national répertoires. Growing interconnectedness and sustained urbanization generate, in their turn, contradictions within traditional nationalist representations, which no longer serve actual needs. The image of an Albanian national territory as homogeneous container, a map with thick borders, is thus flanked by the image of the territory as made up of urban conglomerates (Tirana-Durrës, Tetovo-Skopje and Prishtinë-Prizren). These urban conglomerates will not stop any soon growing at the expenses of other areas, nor will Albanians stop emigrating when Kosovo becomes independent. New regional imbalances are lurking, and new instabilities that are not those envisaged through the lenses of traditional nationalism.

In the very moment in which new regional challenges emerge, and peripheral states show severe limits in their claim to efficiently regulate, protect, and assist daily needs of individuals, families, and communities, the eternal call to mobilize for the nation-state might eventually lose credit, and a reviewed, urban-based form of nationalism may emerge, looking more sympathetically at city networks, regional development policies, and supranational perspectives. ■

(10) One example is how the privatization process in Albania led the Lebanese capitals to the creation of Seament Albania, with its main cement production factory in Elbasan. In this case, a gigantic \$61 million expansion and modernization project was financed in 2001 by the International Finance Corporation and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Another group which benefited from international capitals is Mak-Albania, part of the Kuwaiti Al-Kharafi Group.

(11) Strazzari, Francesco, "The Balkan Route to State-Making: between Ethnic Collision and Mafia Collusion", in Dietrich Jung (ed.), *Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars* (London, Routledge, 2001).

REFLECTIONS ON THE IRISH 'PEACE PROCESS' – WHAT GERRY ADAMS SHOULD HAVE SAID TO MAHMOUD ABBAS

*James Anderson**

The Northern Ireland 'peace process' is said to have lessons for how other ethno-national territorial conflicts can be resolved; and Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams was invited by Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas to advise on peace in Palestine/Israel. Adams focused on the fact that the USA had been central to initiating a break-through in Ireland/Northern Ireland, but in Palestine/Israel it is part of the problem, bankrolling a belligerent Israel and losing any semblance of being an 'honest broker' for peace.

However, he could also have focused on the fact that after two centuries of national struggles involving Irish nationalists, unionists and the British state, including nine decades of partition, Ireland/Northern Ireland exemplifies the intractability of ethno-national conflict and the high failure rate of nationalistic territorial 'solutions'. Ireland's positive lessons need to be balanced by its negative ones.

Positive and negative lessons

On the positive side, most of the political violence in Northern Ireland has now been stopped, obviously a major achievement for conflict management (and the stage of the peace process about which Gerry Adams was best qualified to advise Mahmoud Abbas - and the Israeli Government if it was listening). The Good Friday Agreement (GFA), ratified in June 1998 by 94% of Southern Irish and 71% of Northern Irish voters (including a narrow majority of the Northern unionists), effectively made the mid-1990s paramilitary cease-fires permanent. And it already contains most of the ingredients necessary for a self-sustaining resolution of conflict, even if some are only embryonic or not quite in place.

It established a consociational power-sharing regional government of Irish nationalists and unionists in Northern Ireland (Strand 1); and North-South cross-border institutions drawn from the Northern and Southern parliaments and government departments with its own secretariat (Strand 2), which radically undercuts the rival claims to absolute territorial sovereignty which bedevil national conflict. There are also East-West inter-governmental institutions linking Ireland and Britain (Strand 3); and additional bodies dealing with equality and human rights. This combination of 'partition plus power-sharing plus cross-border institutions' is a crucial improvement over previous failed strategies of 'partition with some internal integration' and especially over 'partition with majoritarian domination'.

On the negative side, however, the GFA has not succeeded

in resolving the conflict. In reality Northern Ireland has not progressed very far beyond the early management stages of its peace process, and any lessons from it have to be heavily qualified. Firstly, while the paramilitary cease-fires have greatly improved the situation, the conflict between nationalists and unionists continues, albeit more peacefully, and some argue that it has been further institutionalized and reinforced by the internal power-sharing or consociationalism at the heart of the GFA. Secondly, for most of the eight years since 1998, the GFA has actually been in suspension, and since 2002 Northern Ireland has been under 'Direct Rule' by the British Government in London with the Irish Government in Dublin as its 'junior partner'. In consequence, the GFA's innovative cross-border political institutions, formally dependent on Northern power-sharing and jointly operated with the Republic of Ireland, have been seriously curtailed.

The current impasse

Now the two Governments are trying yet again to pressure Northern Ireland's nationalist and unionist parties to re-engage in a power-sharing government. Another deadline passed yesterday, 10th November, when their ambiguous responses were assumed to mean 'agreement in principle', and in practice the latest supposedly 'final' deadline of November 24th is unlikely to be properly met either, but the process will probably continue. By the 24th the parties are supposed to agree the First and the Deputy-First Ministers for a power-sharing government to be established next March - respectively, Ian Paisley leader of the now dominant unionist group, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and Martin McGuinness nominee of the main nationalist party, Sinn Fein (SF). If they don't agree, the Governments threaten that Direct Rule from London will be consolidated.

This 'external rule' is anathema to Irish nationalists, though to be accepted as partners in government (and especially by Paisley's DUP) SF has to support Northern Ireland's police force, which many of its supporters distrust as still a politically biased 'unionist' force. Before it agrees, say SF, local control of the police and justice system must be restored. The converse threat facing the DUP is that if it does not agree to share power with SF, Direct Rule will bring the full operation of the cross-border institutions; with the London and Dublin Governments in close partnership there will be de facto 'joint sovereignty' over

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Northern Ireland. Seen as further moves toward Ireland's political re-unification, this is anathema to unionists, and Paisley is trying to 'sell' power sharing to his own supporters as 'the lesser of two evils'.

But Paisley's problem is that his entire political career over fifty years has been based on opposition to other unionists (such as David Trimble's Ulster Unionist Party, the UUP) sharing power with nationalists. Many of his supporters continue to hold to that position, appearing to hanker after an unobtainable return to unionist majoritarian domination, and the DUP has done little to prepare them for a radical shift in policy. In contrast, SF has been adept at managing 'political somersaults' (not least operating the British institutions of Northern Ireland government which previously the IRA tried to bomb out of existence), though supporting the police is still too big a jump for a sizeable minority of its supporters. Hence delay and prevarication with each party blaming the other, while both also seek to consolidate their present electoral dominance of unionism and nationalism respectively (the DUP over the 'more moderate' UUP, SF over the 'more moderate' nationalists in the SDLP). But prolonged Direct Rule would remove much of the DUP's reason for existence, and it would curtail SF's electoral/governmental ambitions in the separate Southern Irish electorate by denying it governmental kudos in the North. Hence the probability is that both the DUP and SF will eventually agree a power-sharing government, particularly as their key 'sticking points' are now perhaps less about substance than about sequencing - who agrees to what first - as they inch forward, playing for time to convince their own supporters.

More fundamental problems

The 'real lessons' for other conflicts are therefore not quite the positive or straightforward messages envisaged by enthusiasts for the 1998 Good Friday Agreement - such as President Bill Clinton, one of its midwives. The Irish evidence is that 'peace processes' may simply be a long drawn-out continuation of conflict by other means; and that conflict management requires ingenuity, time and money, though it is less costly in resources and lives than mismanagement (as we saw in the wasted decades from the 1970s to the early 1990s when the British in Northern Ireland pursued a so-called 'internal solution' - a contradiction in terms when Ireland's partition and border is the central problem). As Michael Kerr (2005) shows for Northern Ireland and for Lebanon, conventional power-sharing or consociationalism is dependent on continuing external support, both 'carrots and sticks', with little prospect of becoming self-sustaining. Here Northern Ireland enjoys much the greater support (from the British and Irish Governments, the EU, and the US - the contrast underlined when Israel invaded Lebanon with US and UK backing); and it is a sobering thought that despite getting substantially more international support than

many other peace-processes, Northern Ireland is still far from a genuine resolution of its conflict. Some indeed argue that all the external support may actually prolong matters, giving the local political rivals an inflated sense of their own importance, and freedom to indulge in irresponsible, time-wasting 'brinkmanship' knowing that the external 'conflict managers' (e.g., the London and Dublin Governments) will have to take responsibility for the ensuing problems. Conversely, it can be argued that continued dependence on external support means being at the mercy of political forces whose priorities by definition are usually elsewhere.

There is also the argument - often associated with the 'integrationist' advocates of socially assimilating rival ethno-nationalists - that the institutional guarantees, 'checks and balances' of consociational power-sharing have a built-in tendency to rigidify and reinforce the very divisions on which the conflict is based. Some 'integrationists' see this as already happening in Northern Ireland, in the so-called 'victory of the extremes' over the 'moderates' (SF over SDLP, DUP over UUP). However, as already noted, for most of the last eight years power sharing has actually been in suspension and there are other reasons for the relative success of SF and the DUP (e.g., much better party organization than their respective rivals). In fact, the 'integrationist' critics of consociationalism often seem to forget that there was a war to be stopped and that institutional guarantees of power sharing are essential for stopping it. When the over-riding objective is to end violent hostilities and achieve 'ceasefires' with some initial, minimal agreement between warring ethno-national protagonists, the consociationalists are generally realistic in insisting that elaborate, guaranteed and hence rather static power-sharing arrangements are essential. Timing and the stage of the conflict/peace-process are critical. For instance, at a recent conference on the 10th anniversary of the 'Dayton' power-sharing settlement of a two-part but single Bosnian state, most of us focused on criticizing its decentralized consociationalism. But, coming from an earlier stage of a 'peace process', the Israeli geographer, Oren Yiftachel (2006), cogently argued in favour of a 'Dayton in Palestine', as preferable to its present partition, 'separation fence', violence and an undermined 'two-state solution'.

More radical remedies

What is now appropriate in Ireland may have limited relevance for conflicts at different stages. But static arguments about 'integration' versus 'consociation' are generally misleading; and consociationalism is necessary but not sufficient. It does indeed tend to reinforce and perpetuate divisions. If there is to be a move to self-sustaining conflict resolution, as distinct from continued dependence on external management, we need a shifting emphasis toward complementary and more radical

remedies which (like the GFA's innovative North-South institutions) are non-territorial or less territorial, crossing territorial and ethnic borders.

Ireland shows that both the intractability of ethno-national conflicts and the high failure rate of territorial 'solutions' such as partition, are rooted in the limitations of territoriality and modern statehood, where nationalism, sovereignty and democracy are all defined in mutually reinforcing territorial terms (see Anderson 2006). Flawed assumptions about them are typically shared by external 'conflict managers' from other national governments, as well as by the immediate protagonists. Their managerial 'solutions' primarily rest on control by separation and segregation, whereas conflict resolution requires cross-border contact and co-operation.

Where rival ethno-national groups are geographically intermingled (as in Ireland and Palestine), 'solutions' which attempt to impose nationalistic territoriality are at best doomed to generate further conflict, at worst are a recipe for 'ethnic cleansing' and continued disaster for all concerned (though some groups suffer more than others). Instead, solutions require the crossing of territorial and ethnic borders, whether state or local, material or symbolic, and not just in political institutions (as in the GFA) but also in civil society. Indeed the resolution potential of border-crossing institutions depends on the extent to which they foster living, functioning 'interest groups' or 'political communities' which cross the borders, in more creative conflicts over non-national issues. This is probably not something which Gerry said to Mahmoud. Real solutions - real resolutions - of ethno-national conflict need to break with nationalistic, territorialist conceptions and practices. ■

About ConflictINFOCUS:

Conflict In Focus is a bi-monthly online bulletin designed to provide busy readers in the EMP policy community and interested general public with a concise and regular update on the current state-of-affairs of the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict in the Middle East. Conflict in Focus is compiled by RCCP/IAI, drawing on multiple sources including the resources of our software (CCP).

Conflict in Focus alerts readers to situations where, in the near future, there is a particular risk of new or significantly escalated conflict. In specific, the newsletter is divided into three sections. The first section includes accounts of and comments on EU developments and policies during the previous two months in the field of conflict prevention.

In its second section, Conflict in Focus summarizes recent developments in a conflict analysis perspective, using our CCP model of analysis, where the overall situation in each case has significantly deteriorated.

The third and final section aims at providing experts and researchers from the Partnership with a forum for common work and collaboration. Toward this end, the newsletter will host, in each issue, two short articles, one by a European scholar and the other by a Middle Eastern one on conflict prevention in the Middle East, with the final aim of provoking a debate on such sensitive subject.



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