

## Editorial

### THE NUCLEARIZATION OF IRAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST: NEW TRENDS, OLD QUESTIONS

Lars Olberg\*

This issue of "Conflict in Focus" addresses the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is a seemingly never-ending story<sup>(1)</sup>. No day passes without reports in the news about the threat of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and the potential consequences. The international community, primarily the United States, tries to prevent Iran from installing the technology necessary to build these weapons. Iran, on the other hand, permanently stresses its 'inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology' and highlights that its program and the use of its nuclear technology have a peaceful character.

This conflict raises a number of questions: what is its impact on the security in the region? Can it cause a domino effect leading other states to go nuclear? How and when will the international community react if Iran's program is indeed aimed to build up a nuclear arsenal? Is the program indigenous or is Iran being supported by other states or non-state actors like the former A.Q. Khan network? Should Iran be allowed to continue with its program? Is the country adhering to its legal obligations? Do sticks work better than carrots? While some of these questions are extensively and controversially discussed by the scientific community. Other questions have not received sufficient attention. This newsletter will provide a forum to address frequently ignored questions.

The issue's first contribution by Gabriel Martinez is dedicated to the regional impact of Iran's nuclear program. The author raises the question of what reaction regional powers would have to a nuclear-armed Iran, and what steps they might take to prevent it. He makes the point that for several reasons, military action to prevent Tehran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is unlikely, and that for similar reasons, an Iranian Bomb is unlikely to result in a regional arms race.

*continued on page 2*

\* Lars Olberg is a PhD candidate at the law department of the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany. He is also a candidate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He has served as an adviser to the European Commission at the 2005 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

(1) For detailed information on the chronology of events see 'In Focus: IAEA and Iran', International Atomic Energy Agency, <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/laealran/index.shtml>, and 'Iran Special Collection', Center for Nonproliferation Studies, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/iran/index.htm>.

## IN THIS ISSUE

### 01 Editorial

Nuclearization of Iran and the Middle East: New Trends, Old Questions

Lars Olberg

### The Forum

### 03 The Regional Impact of a Nuclear Iran

Gabriel Martinez

### 06 What Options the Region Has after Iran's Nuclearization? The Jordanian Case

Lars Olberg

### 09 The Iran Nuclear Program and the prospects for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East

Thomas Mättig

### 12 The Nuclearization of Iran and the Shi'a Revivalism

Azher Khan

The views expressed in this issue are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Regional Center on Conflict Prevention at the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy.

[www.rccp-jid.org](http://www.rccp-jid.org)

*continued from page 1*

In the second article of the newsletter, Thomas Mättig takes a look at the implications the Iranian nuclear program has for the prospects of the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The author starts by laying out the concept of a NWFZ before he describes the progress and setbacks that occurred over the years trying to establish such a zone. He refers further to the role of Iran's nuclear program and the IAEA-standoff as a stumbling block for the whole project. The author comes up with concrete steps that should be taken to further the project. However, it is not only up to Iran to make steps towards the right direction, no matter how troublesome its nuclear program and its current behavior are. A NWFZ in the region is an overarching project that requires concessions by each country.

I myself will take a look at the question, 'Is the Iranian nuclear program a unique case or has it caused the international community to generally attempt to prevent countries in the Middle East from becoming nuclear powers? The focus will be on the decisions, announced in the beginning of the year, of six countries in the Middle East to start nuclear programs.. Among these states are Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Background information will be provided concerning the fuel cycle technology to show how it can be used equally for peaceful and for weapons purposes. Considering this dual-use applicability and using Jordan as an example I will lay out options on how a country can set up a nuclear sector without unduly increasing proliferation risks and raising concerns among the international community.

Azher Khan addresses a different kind of concern that is not related to the question whether other states will pursue nuclear weapons programs in reaction to the Iranian nuclear program. He will rather focus on the non-state level. His article has to be seen against the background that Iran has become a major regional force in the region, primarily due to its ongoing nuclear activities. Khan will analyze the relationship between Iran's nuclear program and the Shi'a empowerment currently taking place in the Middle East. A clear connection between this empowerment and the nuclear (weapons) program could result in the decision of other states to expand or upgrade their military arsenals to counter a potential non-state threat emanating from the empowered Shias. ■

### THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF A NUCLEAR IRAN

*Gabriel Martinez\**

The Iranian nuclear energy program is one of the most significant current events in the nonproliferation arena. The goals of the program are one of the key items of contention between parties involved in the dispute. Tehran claims that the program is intended for the peaceful production of electrical power, while the United States and other western powers claim that Tehran intends to develop nuclear weapons. Still other observers believe that the Iranian government is hedging, that is, that it wishes to maintain the capability to develop nuclear weapons, should it desire to do so at a future date. In order to evaluate the regional impact of this program in a "worst case scenario" light, this analysis will assume for the sake of argument that the true goal of Tehran's nuclear energy program is nuclear weapons capability rather than peaceful uses or nuclear hedging.

This brings us to the purpose of this analysis: what impact would a nuclear-armed Iran have on the region? Would other regional powers be driven to develop nuclear weapons as well? Would a nuclear Iran lead to greater instability in the region? The impact would, contrary to popular belief, be minimal. In order to demonstrate this, the examples of regional nations that stand to be the most affected will be discussed.

#### 1. Who stands to lose?

##### Israel

Any analysis of nuclear issues involving the Middle East would be remiss if it did not discuss Israel first. Israel possesses a significant (both quantitatively and qualitatively) nuclear weapons arsenal as well as a wide range of delivery systems. In addition to this, Israel maintains the most powerful conventional military force of any regional power. Israel and Iran have a well-documented antagonistic relationship and Israeli officials have stated publicly that they are opposed to Tehran's nuclear program and view a so-called Iranian Bomb as a threat not only to national security but to national existence, given the anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Iranian government.

In 1981 Israel bombed the Osiraq plutonium-producing reactor in Iraq, making the same claim about the nascent Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Although at the outer ranges of its force-projection capability, Israel is also capable of using air forces to strike targets in Iran.<sup>(1)</sup>

##### United States & Iraq

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Iraq

had (until the 2003 US-led invasion) an openly hostile relationship that had on several occasions broken out into violence, most notably including the Iran-Iraq war. Since the removal of the Hussein regime, relations have simultaneously thawed slightly and become vastly more complicated, as the Iranian military appears to be providing advanced munitions and training in support of the Iraqi insurgency.<sup>(2)</sup> Given the current state of affairs in Iraq, namely the complete inability of the nominal government to control the internal situation, foreign relations and concern over Iranian nuclear ambitions are a significantly lower priority than they were before the invasion.

Given the massive American military presence in the region in general and in Iraq in particular, the American government is naturally opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran given the antagonism present between the two since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The US also fears that Iran might one day develop intercontinental ballistic missiles with sufficient range to deliver nuclear warheads onto US soil.

##### Other regional powers

In the last decade, relations between Iran and the other major political and military powers of the region; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Egypt, have improved significantly and are no longer particularly adversarial in nature. The involvement of these two countries will be discussed in more detail later.

#### 2. A military response?

Next is the question of what these countries might do in response to an Iranian development (or threatened imminent development) of nuclear weapons. Political pressure is currently being exerted by many parties in order to prevent this development, but seems destined to failure. A country that is determined to develop nuclear weapons will almost certainly do so absent of physical intervention by an outside power. The possibility of this intervention in the form of armed conflict is the issue which poses the greatest threat to regional stability. Israel has demonstrated by their actions with the Osiraq

\* Gabriel Martinez is a graduate of the Masters program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies where he specialized in Nonproliferation Studies. He currently works as a contractor for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

(1) Raas, Long, "Osiraq Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities." SSP Working Paper. Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. April 2006. Available from [http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/working\\_papers/wp\\_06-1.pdf](http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/working_papers/wp_06-1.pdf)

(2) Baker, Peter. *Iranians Aid Iraq Militants, Bush Alleges*. The Washington Post. 15 February 2007. p.A01

situation that they are willing to engage in pre-emptive combat in order to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a hostile power. As was stated earlier, Israel has the capability to strike Iran. However, an operation of this type would require performance by a significant portion of Israel's strike aircraft, with an uncertain chance for success. This is due to the geographically dispersed nature of the Iranian nuclear facilities, as well as the fact that many are underground, requiring in a highly coordinated fashion multiple munitions strikes.<sup>(3)</sup> The United States is far more capable of performing such a strike.

The United States enjoys a massive qualitative and quantitative conventional superiority over the Islamic Republic of Iran, even if only forces currently in-theater are counted. In the event of a conflict, American forces have the capability to all but eliminate Tehran's conventional military capability in a matter of hours.<sup>(4)</sup>

An attack of this type would almost certainly be conducted prior to Tehran's hypothetical development of deployed nuclear warheads. The reasons for this are threefold: First, once the development process has been completed and requisite technical knowledge gained, any facilities lost to combat actions could be replaced much more quickly than the time taken for their initial development. Secondly, once a weapon has been produced, it would likely be moved away from the development facilities, making location and destruction far more difficult. Thirdly, once weapons have been constructed, Iran would possess the capability for nuclear retaliation, a possibility that both Israel and the United States would rather avoid than confront.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, the Iranian nuclear facilities are for the most part dispersed and underground making the chances for a successful strike, regardless of the level and sophistication of force used to conduct it, less than certain if only air forces are used.<sup>(5)</sup> The use of air power to destroy a nuclear program also assumes that the attacker has sufficient intelligence regarding the locations and disposition of relevant facilities, which the United States does not.<sup>(6)</sup> Given American commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the rest of the world, it is unlikely that the United States possesses the political will (and certainly does not possess the ability) to be involved in another ground invasion.

### 3. An arms race?

One of the most fundamental tenets of nonproliferation theory is that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a nation will lead to other nations doing the same. The case of Iran demonstrates that this is not always true. Assuming for the sake of argument that the true goal of Tehran's nuclear energy program is the creation of a nuclear weapons capability, we must consider which

countries might feel sufficiently threatened by such a development to undertake their own weapons' programs. The primary adversaries of Iran; the United States and Israel, already possess nuclear weapons. Other powers of note in the region with which Iran has had antagonistic relations in the past; Saudi Arabia and Egypt, now enjoy much better relations with Tehran, and though unlikely to view a nuclear Iran with pleasure they are less likely to view it as a direct threat than they would have in the past. Furthermore, both countries enjoy at the very least a cordial relationship with the United States. Large numbers of American troops are currently located both in the Gulf and in Iraq, between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and are unlikely to leave in the near future. This makes a conventional Iranian military attack all but impossible. Any Iranian strike force could easily be destroyed while still within Iran if US forces were given advance notice. Even without such notice, US naval aviation assets in the region are more than sufficient to deny the area to Iranian forces.

In the case of Egypt there are other political reasons why it would not be driven to develop its own nuclear capability. The most significant among these are concerns over internal stability and the continuity of government. The Egyptian government is not certain what the future holds for the country and does not want a possible extremist government in the future to be armed with nuclear weapons.

In a scenario where Iran possessed nuclear weapons, it is profoundly unlikely, given the relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, that the United States would not defend the Saudis from Iranian aggression, possibly up to and including the use of American nuclear weapons from nearby naval (aircraft carrier and submarine) assets as well as Air Force assets originating from or routing through the atoll of Diego Garcia. Saudi Arabia is already widely thought to be considering a nuclear program.<sup>(7)</sup> However, given the removal of the primary security threat (Saddam Hussein's Iraq), this desire has waned. In addition, a Saudi desire for nuclear

(3) Long

(4) The "Millennium Challenge '02" war game conducted by the United States demonstrated that Iranian naval forces and shipping assets could, if properly utilized in an asymmetric conflict, destroy a large portion of American naval assets in the region. See analysis conducted by The Guardian (6 September 2002), available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,787017,00.html>

(5) Salama, Sammy, Ruster, Karen. "CNS Research Story: A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences". James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 12 August 2004. Available from <<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040812.htm>>

(6) Katz, Keinon & Guttman. "Israel feels US will not attack Iran". The Jerusalem Post. 24 August 2006. Available from <<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1154525940706&pagename=JPost%2FJP Article%2FShowFull>>

(7) "Saudia Arabia working on secret nuclear program with Pakistan help - report." Forbes.com. 28 March 2006. Available from <<http://www.forbes.com/finance/feeds/afx/2006/03/28/afx2629000.html>>.

weapons is more likely based on a desire to compete for regional prestige with nuclear-armed Israel, rather than a perception of Iran as a credible threat.

If Iran does one day possess nuclear arms, they would then be subject to the same "rules" of international conduct that all other nuclear weapon states have abided by - namely, that the use of nuclear weapons in combat will result in a retaliation in kind. I believe that a desire for self-preservation would ultimately prevail, that the leadership in Tehran would not risk its own destruction, which would be the most probable outcome to an Iranian use of nuclear weapons in anger.

In addition, Iran's other major neighbor, Pakistan, is already a nuclear power and furthermore has had cooperative relations with Iran dating back to Pakistani independence, followed by formal military ties during the period of the Central Treaty Organization.

#### 4. Conclusion

It is unlikely that the development of nuclear weapons by Iran would lead to an arms race in the region. This is both because Iran's major antagonists already possess either nuclear arms or a significant conventional deterrent, and because the remaining powers are unlikely to view Iran as much of a threat as they might have previously, particularly now that the United States has a massive military presence even closer to their borders. Although Egypt and Saudi Arabia are still in the slow process of improving relations with Tehran, these countries likely do not view Iran as a significant military threat. This is particularly true given the wide geographic separation between Egypt and Iran and the US military presence between all involved parties. Recent proposals for large sales of conventional weapons to Saudi Arabia have been viewed by some as a reflection of Saudi desire to build up its conventional force in the face of possible Iranian aggression.<sup>(8)</sup> However when viewed in light of the close political relationship between the respective leaders in these two countries it is more likely that this instead reflects a desire on the part of the Saudis to further this relationship by supporting American defense contractors. In making such a move, the Saudis could rest assured in being repaid in kind through the benefit of American foreign policy.

Neither the United States nor Israel is likely to take military action against Iran to prevent this acquisition given the military issues that both face, coupled with the fact that such an action has an uncertain probability of success, with a potentially massive political blowback. Iran's unconventional warfare capabilities (both directly and through third parties such as the Lebanese Hezbollah) are also a significant concern, especially in

light of Hezbollah's recent conflict with Israel, widely viewed as an Israeli defeat.<sup>(9)</sup> These are the reasons that military action does not appear to be capable of halting proliferation and weapons development by a determined country. Only intensive diplomatic efforts will be able to accomplish that goal. If diplomatic pressure should fail, and the state in question develops a weapons capability then those efforts must be redirected to disarmament. Ultimately, a scenario where one more state has nuclear weapons is far more desirable than one where an attempt to destroy those weapons results in their use. Furthermore, if Iran's intentions are not actually the creation of a weapons capability, nothing is surer to change than if Iran were to be faced with military strikes. ■

---

(8) Wright, Robin. "U.S. Plans New Arms Sales to Gulf Allies". The Washington Post. 28 July 2007. Available from <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/27/AR2007072702454.html>>.

(9) "Hizbullah's shallow victory". The Economist. 17 August 2006. Available from [http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?Story\\_ID=E1\\_SSJGSJD](http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=E1_SSJGSJD)

## WHAT OPTIONS THE REGION HAS AFTER IRAN'S NUCLEARIZATION? THE JORDANIAN CASE

Lars Olberg

For several years the international community has tried to prevent Iran from continuing its activities in the field of nuclear enrichment. In their attempts to do so the various actors used sticks and carrots, ranging from blunt threats of war to economic incentives. Iran constantly stresses that its nuclear program is in accordance with its international obligations and is solely intended for peaceful purposes. Therefore, it takes the position that any restriction would infringe its 'inalienable right' to nuclear technology as granted by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Some western states, primarily the United States, categorize Iran as 'rogue state' and assume that the country's real motives behind the nuclear program are the production of nuclear weapons. Against this background this article analyzes the recent decisions by several countries in the Middle East to start a nuclear program, using Jordan as an example<sup>(1)</sup>. The decision as such, namely to start a nuclear energy program in favor of alternative energy production methods, is not questioned.

### 1. Background

Earlier this year Jordan's energy minister stated that the country expects to have a nuclear power plant operating by 2015. He also mentioned that the nuclear program is exclusively dedicated to peaceful purposes and will be used for electricity and desalination only. Similar statements were made by the Iranian side but this has not prevented the aggravation of the dispute over the time culminating in the recent adoption of sanctions. So the question arises in how far the Jordanian program will likewise be seen as a threat to the security in the region. Will Jordan's decision evoke reactions that are similar to those in the Iran case? How would the various programs in the region impact each other? Could Jordan's program function as a model for other states?

The answers depend on how Jordan decides to set up its program, namely how it intends to obtain nuclear fuel which is needed for a nuclear program. The technology for nuclear fuel production is of a dual use nature: it can be used for fuel production and for weapons production. It is therefore always closely intertwined with proliferation concerns. Three options are at hand for the Jordanian program that will be measured using the following criteria: cost, timeliness, dependency and proliferation risks.

### 2. Own nuclear fuel cycle

The first option for Jordan is to build a full nuclear fuel

cycle<sup>(2)</sup> inside the country. This would cover all steps that are necessary to produce nuclear fuel, most importantly the conversion and the enrichment facilities. This would definitely be the most expensive option. A study on the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle program estimated the costs to amount to roughly \$1 billion. This would be a huge burden for the cash-strapped kingdom. The costs seem to be unreasonably high especially because the Jordan program would be limited to one or two reactors. The costs of a fuel cycle for such a small program would be disproportionate to its benefit.

In addition to this it is highly questionable whether Jordan is in a position to start such an ambitious program of building a full fuel cycle and bringing it to conclusion within eight years. It would require enormous capacity building, e.g. the training of nuclear scientists and other personnel. Furthermore, establishing a nuclear fuel cycle in the country would increase the risk of proliferation of nuclear material. However, Jordan has signed the IAEA additional protocol; therefore all of its nuclear facilities are subject to thorough inspections. This step shows that it is very unlikely that Jordan intends to pursue a nuclear weapons program itself but the general risk of diversion of nuclear material by and to non-state actors cannot be excluded from consideration.

On the other hand, pursuing this option would enable Jordan to reduce its dependency on oil imports, which cover currently over 90 % of Jordan's energy needs. Jordan possesses some Uranium ore which could be mined and used for the production of nuclear fuel so that the country would also be independent from the import of ore.

### 3. Import of nuclear fuel

Jordan's second option is to renounce any intention to build fuel cycle facilities and rather to import all the nuclear fuel it needs for its power plant(s). This would be the cheapest and the quickest option because there would be no need to set up extensive infrastructure and far fewer nuclear engineers and physicists would need to be trained. Furthermore, Jordan could flexibly define how much fuel it wants to import. The proliferation risk

(1) King Abdullah II announced its plans for a peaceful nuclear program in an interview with Haaretz on January 9, 2007, <http://www.jordanembassyus.org/hmka01192007.htm>. The other states in the region include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Turkey. In some sources also Northern African states are listed.

(2) For an introduction into the nuclear fuel cycle see: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, World Nuclear Association, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf03.html>.

that would be connected with this option would only be minimal because there would be no enrichment and reprocessing capabilities inside the country. Nowadays all fuel delivery contracts contain a take-back clause, according to which the spent fuel has to be returned to the providing country. In consequence the fuel would only stay in Jordan for the time it is used in the reactor, so that the options for diversion are very limited. However, Jordan would be dependent on the delivery of the nuclear fuel by foreign states or companies. This has to be seen as a step of diversification regarding the suppliers and the types of energy. Therefore the import of nuclear fuel reduces the dependency on oil imports.

#### 4. Multilateral fuel cycle

The IAEA Director General El Baradei tabled the idea of the multilateral fuel cycle. Based on this proposal groups of states cooperate in fuel production. They set up a joint fuel cycle facility and share the costs and benefits. One of the benefits is that in the long-run the production of fuel is cheaper than its import. The access to its own fuel cycle also reduces the dependency on other states' consent when it comes to the delivery of the fuel. Furthermore, due to the joint efforts the facilities can be set up faster and the individual states need only to train fewer personnel for their operation and maintenance. A precondition for the development of this system is that the terms of cooperation are negotiated, which itself may take a long time. Due to the fact that there will only be one new fuel cycle installed instead of one in every country the increase in the proliferation threat is limited, though existent.

#### 5. Evaluation

As laid out, the first option, namely the genuine nuclear fuel cycle, is detrimental to Jordan's interests in the field of costs, timeliness and proliferation concerns. Only the dependency aspect is positive. But the same level of independence can be achieved by pursuing the path of a multilateral fuel cycle. Especially for a group of smaller states a multilateral fuel cycle is a sound option because together they can use the facilities efficiently which would not be possible with their individual small programs. In addition to that the multilateral fuel cycle has a very positive side effect: the cooperation among states serves as a confidence building measure and can thereby contribute to the peace and stability in the region. However, the establishing of such a multilateral fuel cycle will take time; therefore it can only be a long-term goal for Jordan. In the short run Jordan should stick to the second option and import the fuel for its reactor as this is the cheapest and most flexible option that also poses the lowest proliferation risk. Therefore no concerns on the side of the international community are to be expected.

#### 6. Regional impact

The question is, in how far Jordan, if it pursues the suggested path, could serve as a model for other states in the region. This question is closely related to whether Jordan would find partners for its multilateral fuel cycle aspirations.

Various reasons exist, why other states would rather refrain from making the same decisions as Jordan. The main point here is the pride of the states and their leaders, respectively. Some of them perceive their countries as a major Arab nation. As a major nation they are, according to their reading, entitled if not obliged to have their own fuel cycle, especially as mastering nuclear technology is still regarded to be a huge technical accomplishment. For that reason they cannot accept not to master the technology and to be dependent on the fuel delivering countries. This would be seen as lowering their standing among other countries in the region and in regional or international fora like the Non-Aligned Movement. In addition to that it would be very difficult to convince a bigger Arab country to follow the lead of a small country like Jordan. They think that it is up to them to lead the way and not to follow. Furthermore, nuclear technology can always serve as a political bargaining chip as it might be used by states to coerce Western states to make concessions or grant assistance. This is a dangerous tool, however, that can easily poison the overall relationship between the states.

For those states, that plan to pursue a nuclear weapons program or have nuclear hedging capabilities<sup>(3)</sup>, a nuclear fuel cycle is essential to be in a position to enrich the uranium to weapons grade levels or to reprocess the spent fuel and thereby get hold of plutonium.

On the other hand there are better reasons to assume that the states in the region that plan to pursue a nuclear program will follow the Jordanian model in spite of the just mentioned arguments. First and foremost, a nuclear program is very expensive; many states will already struggle with the costs of building a nuclear power plant. The enormous additional costs for the fuel cycle and the connected capacity building would constitute a prohibiting factor. With the exception of certain Gulf States, which could use their petro-dollars to buy turnkey facilities, this is true for most of the countries in the region that are cash strapped, especially Egypt and Jordan. But not only the costs can be too high for the states; also the technological level can turn out to be an insurmountable barrier. Nuclear technology is

---

(3) Nuclear hedging is the establishment of a nuclear capability up to the level that all facilities needed for nuclear weapons production without even starting the production. Once the decision for building the bomb is taken, it can be done in a very short time.

difficult to master and repeated set-backs would rather be detrimental to the stand of the country than provide it with some grandeur.

Also the dependency argument is not convincing. States in the region are already dependent - some on the delivery of oil, others on foreign financial aid. It was laid out above that an import of nuclear fuel would diversify the means of energy and thereby reduce their dependency on the existing energy suppliers.

In addition to that the security situation and the threat perception among the states under discussion varies significantly from the Iranian viewpoint. Iran is surrounded by roughly 200.000 U.S. soldiers, two of its neighbors have nuclear arsenals, in the past the country's government was toppled by a coup that was orchestrated by foreign intelligence services and Iran is frequently exposed to threats of war and regime change. These facts determine the threat perception which Iran might think it can only withstand with nuclear weapons. This is especially the case since the example of North Korea has shown that a nuclear weapon can be a certain guarantee against aggression by other states. The Arab states under discussion are exposed to a different security situation: they face no similar external threat. Not only Jordan, but also many other states in the region are allies of the United States and other Western countries. Turkey is even member of NATO and therefore covered by its nuclear umbrella. Jordan and Egypt, the two countries that plan to have a nuclear energy program and that are neighbor to the only (non-declared) nuclear weapon state in the region, Israel, have signed peace treaties with this country.

While nuclear weapons might be seen by some as a status symbol, it has a far more positive effect, if a country takes a role as peace promoter and verifiably uses nuclear energy only for non-military uses. Canada or Sweden, for example, are countries with nuclear technology in place. Due to their commitment to the peaceful uses and their longstanding cooperation with the IAEA there are no concerns about a potential misuse. In connection with their overall peace-promoting policy this has granted them a far higher international standing than it would have been the case if they had nuclear weapons. Ireland or even the small Luxemburg are other examples for this stand. Especially in a region that is conflict-prone a peace-promoting approach by a country could lead to a peace-dividend. Foreign states are far more likely to invest in a stable and peace-promoting country. Therefore this path is connected with economic benefits. These are in stark contrast to the high costs of a nuclear fuel cycle or even a weapon program that might even trigger economic sanctions.

Especially due to the fact, that Iran claims that the Western

world wants in general to prevent developing countries from acquiring nuclear energy or technology, the West will be keen to prove that these accusations are wrong. Therefore it will be willing to cooperate with states that pursue a nuclear energy program that is verifiably for peaceful purposes only and will support those states. This support will not only significantly reduce the costs of the programs but also the time that is needed until the first nuclear power plant can produce energy.

## 7. Conclusion

As laid out there are numerous strong arguments why it will be likely that states in the region follow the proposed Jordanian model and first import their nuclear fuel while later on cooperating on a joint nuclear fuel cycle. This will not be for altruistic or idealistic reasons but for plain economic reasons and a different security situation. For those reasons it is very important that Jordan takes decisive steps in this direction. Thereby the Hashemite Kingdom can show, that it is possible, to have a nuclear program in place, to get support from the Western world, to increase its energy security, while at the same time not increase proliferation risks and thereby to contribute to confidence and peace building in the region. ■

## THE IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Thomas Mättig\*

With the Iranian nuclear program approaching the threshold of a possible military application, and regional tensions mounting, the prospects for a stable peace in the Middle East seem dull. The Iranian crisis rather highlights the volatility of the security balance in the region and the urgent need to find a political solution to this problem before the Middle East is rampaged by another war.

With the end of the Cold War superpower rivalry, regional dynamics and conflicts have become the center of international attention. After the disintegration of one of the two all-embracing security alliances, states in several parts of the world have entered a regional struggle for dominance. These conflicts bear a high risk of escalation, especially if weapons of mass destruction are engaged. These weapons - first and foremost nuclear weapons - heavily threaten any regional balance by granting unprecedented power to a state and making it almost invulnerable. It is therefore convenient to search for genuinely regional solutions to these conflicts. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) can provide a framework for nuclear nonproliferation that complements the universal regime of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Primarily, these zones address regional grievances, but they are also heirs to the decolonization movement by attempting to limit the influence of the officially recognized nuclear powers - the USA, Russia, Great Britain, France and China - in the region's security affairs.

The Middle East is in need of both aspects of NWFZ. On one hand, the region is afflicted by numerous conflicts, the most prominent being the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli-Arab conflict. The prevailing attitude towards security in the region resembles the Hobbesian „war of all against all“: Security is seen as a zero-sum game with one party's gains being the other ones losses and vice-versa. Whereas in the European Union, security is seen as something that can only be achieved together, cooperation in the Middle East is volatile, short, and subject to shifts in interest and alliances.

On the other hand, due to its high economic and strategic relevance, the region is in the center of worldwide attention and has a long and bitter history of colonialism. Foreign military within the region is seen as a provocation by many of its citizens and the region has more than once been subject to foreign interests that have heavily interfered with its own development.

A NWFZ or a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone

(WMDFFZ) could help to mitigate both problems. On one hand, it would put a limit to the region's deadly and expensive arms race and establish a forum to cooperatively address security issues. On the other hand, it would include guarantees by the nuclear powers not to attack or threaten to attack any state of the region with nuclear weapons and thus reduce their freedom of action in the Middle East.

NWFZ have been established in several parts of the world with more than 100 states being parties to the treaty. Almost the entire southern hemisphere is covered by NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1986), Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok, 1995) and Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996). With the establishment of the NWFZ in Central Asia in 2006, the first NWFZ has been set up that is entirely within the northern hemisphere. Their establishment itself is generally seen as a confidence building measure and NWFZ have proven helpful to mitigate regional conflicts - such as the struggle for dominance in Latin America between Brazil and Argentina.

Common features of NWFZ are the complete ban of nuclear weapons within the zone: the member states promise not to develop, manufacture, stockpile, acquire, possess, or control any nuclear explosive device. Extensive verification measures usually serve to monitor this pledge. In an additional protocol, the official Nuclear Weapons States offer negative security guarantees - i.e. not to attack, or threaten to attack, any state within the NWFZ with nuclear weapons. In 1975, the UN General Assembly defined the concept of a NWFZ including the above mentioned criteria.<sup>(1)</sup>

Ironically, for the Middle East the concept has originally been proposed by Iran with strong support from Egypt. One year after the war of 1973, which brought the region close to a nuclear escalation, the Shah introduced this proposal to the UN General Assembly. It has repeatedly been issued as a resolution, and since 1980, it is annually unanimously endorsed by the UN General Assembly, with even Israel supporting the initiative.

This idea has been subject of constant discussion since its introduction. In 1990, President Mubarak proposed to include all weapons of mass destruction (nuclear,

\* Thomas Mättig, M.A., graduated from the Ludwigs-Maximilian University in Munich. He is currently a research assistant at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey (USA).

(1) UN General Assembly Resolution 3472 B (December 11, 1975)

biological and chemical weapons) in the zone at a time, when Egypt more and more took the lead on this issue. The background for his proposal was Saddam Hussein's threat of attacking Israel with chemical weapons, and the experience of the Iran-Iraq war where these weapons had already been used. Mubarak's proposal was met with general accord. There is no precedence for this specific concept, however: A Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) does not formally exist yet, and several states in the Middle East are believed to possess chemical weapons or strive to acquire biological agents.

With the Cold War coming to an end and the window of opportunity for peace talks opening, the 1990s saw a peak in the discussions about the concept. The UN General Secretary issued an expert study in 1990 that was welcomed by the General Assembly.<sup>(2)</sup> It recommends confidence building measures, such as a regional nuclear test ban, IAEA safeguards, and the accession of all states in the region to the NPT.<sup>(3)</sup> The report has later been updated to take into account the Mubarak initiative and is still seen as a fundamental document for the issue laying out several measures to reach an agreement. Still, a great consensus about the necessity to establish such a zone exists and has been brought up in numerous initiatives. The idea of a WMDFZ was reflected in the UN Security Council Resolution 687 in 1991, which established UNSCOM and the disarmament of Iraq. In recent years, the discussion about a NWFZ/WMDFZ in the Middle East has made comparatively slow progress. The NPT Review Conference in 1995 called for it, and reaffirmed this standpoint in 2000 and 2005.

The current discussion is reflected in the publication in 2004 of a symposium report by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in cooperation with the League of Arab States.<sup>(4)</sup>

During the Madrid talks, it was already seen as a significant success that the Arms Control and Regional Security talks (ACRS) multilaterally discussed the question of a WMDFZ. Whereas there seems to be widespread consensus about the aim of establishing such a zone, however, central disagreements, especially between Israel and its neighbors, became evident during these talks. As of today, they have not been solved, and since 1995 there have been no more official talks on the subject.

While Israel sees the establishment of a WMDFZ as a sort of final step after concluding successful peace negotiations, the Arab states are promoting the zone as a means to solve the conflict yet most of them are still unwilling to diplomatically recognize Israel. This fundamental disagreement will have to be solved before sustainable negotiations can begin. However, also several important issues within the framework of a WMDFZ are still contested. These issues include the question of verification - Israel is reluctant to accept UN or IAEA

inspections for the fear of being outvoted. The question of sanctions in the case of a breach of treaty is also contested, as is the question of whether conventional armaments should be included in the talks.<sup>(5)</sup>

In light of these difficulties, it is a generally accepted view that the establishment of a WMDFZ would have to address a considerable number of problems and that this discussion would take several years before an agreement could be reached. Confidence, the fundament for good will negotiations, would have to be developed before any success can be expected.

As for the geographic scope of the zone, the frame that has been laid in the 1990 expert study is still widely accepted. The zone would extend from Libya in the west to Iran in the east, Syria in the north to Yemen in the south. While these states would comprise the core of the zone, countries in the periphery could also become parties at a later point in time.

While the Iranian nuclear program represents a considerable setback to any future security talks in the region, a cooperative solution of this problem could further strengthen the idea of a WMDFZ. It is evident that Iran's security concerns would have to be addressed in any solution. Bilateral talks between the US and the Iranian administration are a first step to establish some confidence and might mitigate Iranian fears of a violent regime change. Still, on the long run, every state's security concerns will have to be considered. In this context it is highly questionable if the Israeli policy of nuclear opacity is very helpful. It is evident that Israel possesses nuclear arms, and the policy of 'neither denying, nor confirming' did not keep Iraq, Libya, and, most likely, Iran, from engaging on the path of trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Giving up the policy of nuclear opacity could thus be a part of a confidence building process within the region.

It is fairly easy to take a pessimistic standpoint and perceive the Middle East as a region with unsolvable conflicts. However, this would be too simple. Some progress has been made. In 2003, Libya renounced its nuclear program and opened itself to inspections. There is still hope for a diplomatic solution of the Iranian nuclear crises. And peace talks between Israel and Syria could pave the way for a more sustainable peace in the

(2) Report of the Secretary-General: Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East, A/45/435 (10 October 1990)

(3) Israel is the only state in the region that is not yet party to the NPT.

(4) V. Cserveny et al (Eds.): Building a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East: Global Non-Proliferation Regimes and Regional Experiences, Geneva (UNIDIR) 2004

(5) Claudia Baumgart / Harald Müller, A Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East: A Pie in the Sky?, in: The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004-05, Bd. 28, Nr. 1, S. 45-58.

region, as does the Saudi-Arabian peace initiative from 2002 that has recently been revived.

Generally, the numerous talks and discussions since the introduction of the concept might not have brought the establishment of a WMDFZ considerably closer, but they did help to develop a cadre of experts and a substantial body of information on the issue. Some issues have already been solved, and there is some accord on the outlines of a zone treaty.

Also, experience from other NWFZ might prove helpful when it comes time to implement a WMDFZ in the Middle East. Recent NWFZ, as the Pelindaba treaty and the Central Asian NWFZ include disarmament provisions as nuclear weapons were either stationed, or developed within these regions. This is an important precedent for the WMDFZ in the Middle East, as Israel possesses nuclear weapons that would have to be abolished.

If talks about a WMDFZ should officially resume one day, they would undoubtedly have to include conventional weapons and the role of non-state actors in the region, as the whole security balance would have to be considered, and non-state actors pose a major threat to Israel. However, the most central issue is to build confidence and soothe the fears of the neighbors' for their own security. To be able to build this confidence, an understanding of each others security concerns would have to be achieved. This can only be done through long negotiations and peace talks. The alternative would be disastrous: Another war within the region would lead to severe destruction. It cannot be in any of the parties' interest. The prospect of a cooperative security regime, including a WMDFZ as a central part of it, seems to be the only way out of this situation. ■

## THE NUCLEARIZATION OF IRAN AND THE SHI'A REVIVALISM

Azher Khan\*

The terms 'Shi'a revival' or Shi'a empowerment have been thrown around increasingly in the media, especially in reference to the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon). Certain events in the Middle East such as the war in Iraq have caused people to inquire about this phenomenon. This paper aims to examine the regional implications of this phenomenon in general and more specifically in regard to the initiation of an arms race in the Middle East.

### The Shi'a

The Shi'a Muslims who are also known as 'the followers of Ali (A.S.)' (after the Prophet Muhammad A.S.) are the minority sect in Islam. They make up 10-15% of the Muslim population worldwide, or 130-190 million (out of 1.3 billion Muslims).<sup>(1)</sup> The overwhelming majority of Shi'a (approximately 120 million) live in the area between Lebanon and Pakistan, where they constitute the majority population Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan; the single-largest community in Lebanon; and sizeable minorities in various Gulf emirates, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, (as well as neighboring countries such as India and Tajikistan and in East Africa).<sup>(2)</sup> However, in the bigger scheme, Sunnism clearly dominates the region and 'has long been the face of the greater Middle East, particularly in defining the Arab political culture.' The Shi'a populations have been the underdogs in the region for a long time and have been 'oppressed and marginalized by Sunni Ruling Regimes and majority communities.' Good news did come to the Shi'as of the region in the form of the Iranian revolution of 1979, which 'initially mobilized the Shi'a identity and emboldened the Shi'a masses to follow the Iranian lead, flexing their muscle and asserting their rights elsewhere in the region.' The Iranian revolution served as a source of inspiration and guidance for the oppressed Shi'a populations. It not only created a path to power for the Shi'a to follow but also provided 'financial, moral and organizational support in the Shi'a struggles for rights and representation.

### The Phenomenon

Every trend or phenomenon usually requires a trigger event that sets it off and causes it to spread. Iraq was the lightning rod that helped to set off and spread this phenomenon to other regional Shi'a communities when many Iraqi Shi'as saw the U.S. invasion as 'an opportunity to redress injustices in the distribution of power among the country's major community.'

In his most recent book- The Shia Revival Dr. Vali Nasr argues that this shift in the balance of power in Iraq has sparked this phenomenon commonly referred to as the Shi'a Revival. But what does this mean? What does an actual 'revival' consist of? According to Dr. Nasr, the Shi'a revival 'refers to a consensus among Shi'a governments and movements that gains in Iraq should be protected and entrenched.'<sup>(3)</sup> The war in Iraq helped to set these gains in motion, not only for Shi'as in Iraq but across the region as well. An expectation for positive change has been created and furthermore, Iraq 'showed that it is possible for Shiites, particularly in the Arab world, where they've been out of power everywhere-that it is possible for them to have power.'<sup>(4)</sup> Dr. Nasr is very quick to point out that this phenomenon of empowerment does not mean the advent of 'pan-Shiism,' but this concept does have several implications. First of all, Shi'as in the region and around the world are already bound by a coherent religious view and this view will continue to strengthen and form, especially among the Shi'a communities in the Middle East and consequently, 'a consensus will solidify around the need to defend their political power.'<sup>(5)</sup> Second of all, the example of Iraq (basis for the revival), will cause a 'demonstration effect' in Shia communities throughout the region thus causing these populations to demand 'more say in how they are governed within their own countries.'<sup>(6)</sup> Finally, the third implication will be that these gains in power and sense of assertiveness among the Shia communities 'will reinforce inter-Shia cultural and religious ties, and these ties will in turn sustain the gains in power.'<sup>(7)</sup>

In our examination of the Shi'a revival, it is important

\* Azher Khan is a graduate student at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California. He is currently pursuing his Master's degree in International Policy Studies along with a certificate in Nonproliferation Studies and will graduate in December 2007. He has worked at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in Monterey, California, as a Research Assistant updating the nuclear chronologies for India and Pakistan for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). He also examined the motivations of Algeria and Sudan to develop their own nuclear programs

- (1) Nasr, V. 'The Revival of Shia Islam.' (Event Transcript) The Pew Forum on Religious & Public Life. Washington D.C. (July 24, 2006): Pp. 4.
- (2) Nasr, V. 'Regional Implications of Shi'a Revival in Iraq,' The Washington Quarterly vol. 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): Pp. 9.
- (3) Nasr, V. 'The Tide Turns,' The Shia Revival, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, (2006): Pp. 179.
- (4) Nasr, V. 'The Revival of Shia Islam,' (Event Transcript) The Pew Forum on Religious & Public Life, Washington D.C. (July 24, 2006):Pp.4.
- (5) Nasr, V. 'The Tide Turns,' The Shia Revival, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, (2006):Pp. 179.
- (6) Ibid. Pp. 179.
- (7) Ibid. Pp. 179.

to point out that it does not associate with any single form of government. It also does not allude towards the spread of 'Iranian style Islamic republics nor the prospect that Iraq will become a political model for government in Bahrain or Lebanon.' The empowerment of Shi'a in the Middle East will play out differently in each individual community whether it is Qatar, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Similar factors for empowerment might exist between two different Shi'a communities but it is also quite possible that a different set of factors could propel these same communities.

### Regional Implications

Now that we have established an understanding of the Shi'a Muslims and the concept of the Shi'a revival, we can examine the reactions of the majority Sunni Muslim governments in the region, to this growing phenomenon. There is no question that the Shi'a revival has caught the attention of the regional leaders. They are increasingly feeling concerned because they know that the Shi'a empowerment has ties to the rising regional power which is Iran. Iran itself is the major factor for the empowerment because it is the only solid Shia majority nation in the region and its leadership is revered by Shi'a Muslims throughout the world. Also, we can clearly see that Iran's budding nuclear program did not cause the Shi'a empowerment. However, it did provide certain indirect consequences which may play out in the region. One of these indirect consequences might be its role in creating incentives for other regional powers to build up their militaries to counter a nuclear Iran.

### Arms race in the Middle East?

Various concerns exist in how far the Shi'a revival might contain a destabilizing military component. States in the region might feel threatened by the arising of a new force and thereby feel themselves compelled to react through the buildup of their military. They might do so in an effort to contain Iran and coerce the country to restrain the Shi'a groups or population. The chances of this happening are pretty low and for many reasons. First of all, the Shi'a are a group of people, spread out throughout the Middle East, and are not an individual state. They are a minority sect throughout the majority of the Middle East. Second of all, we have actually seen the Shi'a phenomenon leading to reform and a push for more rights for the Shi'a citizens (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain). These occurrences we could say have been positive reactions by the Arab governments. As a result of these developments, we should not expect to see a military rivalry occurring in the region resulting from the empowerment.

However, the leaders of the region are still concerned about the phenomenon of the Shi'a empowerment, especially after seeing it on display in Lebanon with the

rise of the group that exemplifies the Shi'a empowerment: Hezbollah. This brings us to the question whether regional governments could build up their arsenals not to counter Iran as the Shi'a state but rather to tackle the problem non-state actors, like Hezbollah. The possibility for this always existed in this case due to the fact that Hezbollah is strongly supported and backed by Iran (Shi'a majority) and Syria (Shi'a administration). However, the chances are very high because of one reason: this action would make Arab governments extremely unpopular at home due to the fact that Hezbollah and its leaders are extremely popular on the Arab street, especially after defeating the Israeli conventional force. A second reason would be that Hezbollah's main goal is for the well-being of the Shi'a of southern Lebanon and to eventually rise to power in Lebanon. This is Hezbollah's long-term goal. If Lebanon comes under the rule of Hezbollah, then that would be more of a concern to the other regional states.

Before concluding this section, we must keep in mind the indirect consequences of Iran's nuclear program and how those will come into play when discussing the concept of an arms race in the Middle East and the phenomenon of the Shi'a empowerment. As mentioned above, one indirect consequence would be regional states building up their military arsenal to counter the threat coming from a nuclear Iran and its Shi'a allies in the region. A second indirect consequence would be the creation of an arms race among the non-state actors in the region including: Hamas (Palestine), Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Mehdi Army (Iraq) etc. As Iran continues its ascendance to power (aided by its nuclear development) the possibility always exists that it will provide a military arsenal to empowered Shi'a groups in the region and within its borders. This action might help to solidify Iran's important presence in the region.

### Confront Iran?

However, many discussions about empowered Shi'a groups such as Hezbollah are sure to involve the Shi'a majority nation of Iran. There is no question about it that Iran is a major supporter of Hezbollah, along with Syria. The greatest concern for other states stemming from the Shi'a empowerment is the rise of Iran. Iran is slowly ascending to the top in the region, mainly due to its nuclear development, but also due to the empowerment of the Shi'a Muslims in the region.

Iran is seen as an overwhelming threat by most of the states in the region including the regional powers of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The threat perception has recently been aggravated due to concerns related to Iran's nuclear program. Here we can repeat the same question which we asked earlier, but in reference to Iran: Could the regional states build up their military forces to counter the Islamic Republic of Iran? I believe that this course of action will lead to eventual disaster in an

already fragile region. It would not be in the best interests of regional states not to challenge Iran, the source of the Shi'a empowerment, by building up their conventional forces because this will only raise the tension in the region and might spark a negative domino effect. I believe that the regional states should use more rational means such as establishing strong diplomatic relations with Iran rather than trying to 'add fuel to the fire.'

## Conclusion

The Middle East is a dynamic region with constant change and instability. We are currently seeing two phenomena occurring at the same time, one being the rise of Iran as a regional power and the other being the empowerment of the Shi'a Muslim communities throughout the region. Iran's ascendance in the region is commonly associated with its growing nuclear aspirations. Iran has continued to defy the nonproliferation community as it pushes to fulfill its nuclear aspirations. This defiant behavior illustrated by Iran could serve as a source of inspiration and empowerment for the Shi'a communities who already are linked to the Mullah regime as a result of their religious sect. The Shias could possibly emulate Iran's behavior within their own communities however, this would probably just add to the already present sectarian tensions in the region.

The rise of the Shi'a has caught the attention of the neighboring regional states and their leaders. Many in the region feel threatened by this emerging phenomenon especially since it is closely tied to the rising star in the region-Iran. It is critical for the stability and well-being of the region that leaders in the region react positively and welcome this change instead of reacting through a negative manner. The build up of conventional forces in order to contest the phenomenon or the symbol of Shiism (in the region), Iran, will lead to more dire conditions in the region. An arms race in the Middle East would be 'the last straw' and would possibly throw the region into a major sectarian war.

Finally, Iran is closely intertwined with the phenomenon of the Shi'a revival. It is a growing regional power and will feed off the success of the Shi'a revival in the region, thus asserting its presence even more. This phenomenon began in Iraq but Iran will reap its benefits and will play an important role in leading and defining it.<sup>(8)</sup> This is the reality of the current situation in the Middle East and something that the U.S. and its allies must clearly comprehend before embarking on new frontiers in the region. ■

---

(8) Nasr, V. 'The Rise of Iran,' *The Shia Revival*, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, (2006): Pp. 212.