IDENTIFICATION DATA OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT

NAME OF CONFLICT
Lacking or Ineffective Legal Framework: Constitutional Reform

STAGE OF CONFLICT
Political Dispute to Crisis

HISTORY STATE
New Phase

MAIN ACTORS
Regime, Opposition Parties, Muslim Brotherhood, Journalists, Intellectuals, Professional Unions, NGOs

ESCALATORY POTENTIAL
Null

VICTIMS
No Victims

CONCISE HISTORY OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT

Constitutional Law in Egypt
The current constitution in Egypt dates back to 1971. Its promulgation coincided with Sadat’s battle for power consolidation after the 1967 defeat, followed by Nasser’s death in 1970. It is a composite document, granting basic civil rights and the rule of law, on the one hand, while maintaining the core of Nasser's socialism in declaring that ‘the economic foundation of the Arab Republic of Egypt is democratic socialism’ or that ‘the public sector bears the primary responsibility in the development plan," on the other. Besides its combination of timid liberal elements and Arab socialism, the most prominent characteristic of this constitution lies in the overwhelming powers it granted to the President of the Republic.

In 1979, a High Constitutional Court was established, and, in 1980, the Constitution was amended to consider the Islamic Law (Shari'ah) as the main source of law, with more emphasis being placed on liberal democracy rather than on Nasser’s socialism. Presidential powers, thus, were further increased by abolishing the limit of the third presidential mandate.

Immediately after Sadat’s assassination, on October 6, 1981, Mubarak enacted the Emergency Law that effectively suspended the Constitution by prohibiting public gatherings and allowing ‘preventive’ detention without charges or even military trials of dissidents.

Political Opposition and Constitutional Reform
Egyptian opposition parties started to focus on the issue of constitutional reform in the early nineties. Actually, constitutionalism provided a bridge to overcome the traditional political factionalism of Egyptian political opposition. In 1991, all heads of legal political parties, together with the Muslim Brotherhood, signed a joint statement requesting the President to consider a proposal for a new constitution. The regime reacted with a mixture of indifference, cooptation (promoting regime-sponsored national dialogues) and repression. Nevertheless, the constitutional reform issue continued to emerge throughout the following years. In 1999, a newly founded Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (PCRC, composed by political parties' leaders, judges, journalists, intellectuals, NGOs, etc.) acted in solidarity with 20 arrested Muslim Brothers, demanding the end of the Emergency Law, and calling for free elections, free press, unrestricted formation of parties and independence for syndicates and civil society groups.

Constitutional Reform after the War in Iraq (New Phase)
The deeply unpopular war in Iraq, the worsening situation in the Occupied Territories of Palestine and the deteriorating economic situation in Egypt, gave new impetus to the opposition. The latter is, in fact, increasingly linking up the issue of political reform - mainly expressed by the demand for constitutional change - to the question of national sovereignty, i.e. Egypt’s effective independence from the US; perceived by intellectuals and political activists to be at growing risk
Islamic and secular opposition parties marched together in February-March 2003 protesting against US policies in the region and criticizing the Egyptian regime’s lack of democratic accountability. While demonstrations were not mass-based and definitely not threatening the regime, they still represented an escalation with respect to the past years.
The regime reacted with a mixture of repression and cooptation, arresting, on one side, several anti-war activists, and organizing governmental anti-war rallies led by the National Democratic Party, on the other.

On the same token, the regime initiated a controlled reform process to prevent opposition with the lead on the issue. In this direction is the proposal for political reform of the NDP congress in September 2003, the initiative of a National Dialogue on reform, and the recent Alexandria Symposium on Arab Reform.

The US call for political and economic reform in the region -the Greater Middle East Initiative- is, again, heating the debate on the issue of constitutional reform. The opposition largely sustains that reform could not be imposed by an external actor as it needs to be implemented independently.

SOURCES OF RISK AND VULNERABILITY

CATEGORY
Political Indicators (Risk: Medium; Vulnerability: Null)

PROBLEM AREAS AND ISSUES
Regime (Risk: Medium; Vulnerability: Null)
Authoritarian Regime
Negative political rights and civil liberty index (Freedom House)
Legitimacy deficit of government /regime
Ongoing regime transition
Detrimental political leaders’ personality

Institutions (Risk: Medium; Vulnerability: Null)
Lacking or ineffective legal framework
Repressive or discriminatory legal system
Ineffective governance

International Relations ((Risk: Medium; Vulnerability: Null)
External pressures to adopt international standards
Detrimental external actor(s)’ political interventions

ANALYSIS OF PROBLEM AREAS AND DISPUTED ISSUES

The main issues debated concerning the Constitution amendments are:
• The Emergency Law [Repressive or discriminatory legal system];
• The limitation of presidential powers. The opposition is proposing direct election of candidates (the President is currently elected by the Parliament and then confirmed by a referendum), and the election of a Vice-President has never taken place (never nominated by Mubarak). This last request is linked to the issue of Presidential succession and the opposition’s fears of Mubarak electing his son, Gamal. [Authoritarian regime; detrimental political leaders’ personality];
• The granting of power rotation through fair elections and the free formation of parties [Authoritarian regime, ineffective governance]; and
• Freedom of expression and association (Press Law, NGOs Law, etc.) [Negative political rights and civil liberty index]

The average risk factor for political indicators is medium, while vulnerability is high. However, if we consider problem areas in details, the results change. In that, vulnerability becomes high only in international relations; both the problem areas of regime and institutions have a vulnerability of null instead.

In fact, while the potential conflict between regime and opposition on political reform is largely contained, the escalation is given by external intervention –mainly from the US [External pressures to adopt international standards; Detrimental external actor(s)’s political interventions]. US policies are further undermining the legitimacy of the regime, which is perceived as too subservient to US policies [legitimacy deficit of government/regime].

LIST OF ACTORS OF CONFLICT

Intellectuals
Journalists
Muslim Brotherhood
NGOs
Opposition Parties (WAFD, TAGAMMU’, NASSERIST, LABOUR, LIBERAL,
Professional Unions

By Issue:
Authoritarian Regime; role: adversaries
Negative political rights and civil liberty index (Freedom House); role: adversaries
Legitimacy deficit of government /regime; role: adversaries
On going regime transition; role: adversaries
Detrimental political leaders’ personality; role: adversaries
Lacking or ineffective legal framework; role: adversaries
Repressive or discriminatory legal system; role: adversaries
Ineffective governance; role: adversaries

US
By Issue:
Authoritarian Regime; role: adversary
Negative political rights and civil liberty index (Freedom House); role: adversary
Legitimacy deficit of government /regime; role: adversary
Ongoing regime transition; role: adversary
External pressures to adopt international standards; role: adversary
Detrimental external actor(s)’s political interventions; role: adversary

EU
By Issue:
Authoritarian regime; role: adversary
Negative political rights and civil liberty index (Freedom House); role: adversary
Ongoing regime transition; role: adversary
External pressures to adopt international standards; role: adversary

ANALYSIS OF NATURE, ACTIONS AND AGENDA OF THE ACTORS OF CONFLICT

Political opposition in Egypt is not mass based, with the possible exception of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is still not legally recognized. Presumably, this is the reason behind the relatively important role that journalists, intellectuals, professional unions, and NGOs are playing in the political debate, which is largely confined to the well-educated minority.

All opposition parties (including the illegal Muslim Brotherhood) agree on the need for political reform, coupled by a higher ceiling of civil and political liberties, compared to those granted in the 1971 Constitution, including the limitation of Presidential powers.

However, the Right (Liberal Wafd and Muslim Brotherhood) is also in favour of a substantial amendment of the Constitution, that is in harmony with the new prevailing economic and social situation This, of course, is contradictory to the Democratic Socialism implied by the 1971 constitutional text. For instance, in the pointnfiscation or nationalisation, neither does it allow the positive discrimination for certain social groups (peasants and workers). For them, these measures are perceived as bypassed by the current multiparty system.
Another point of disagreement between the opposition is whether the source of the new Constitution should be traced back to the Islamic Law (Shari'ah). The Muslim Brotherhood is in favour of considering the Islamic Law as the only source for the Constitution. The Left (mainly Nasserists), however, are for a secular law and, finally, the Wafd, is oscillating between the two.
The regime, under pressures both at home and at the international level, is proposing a much more generic reform programme consisting, mainly, in the formation of a National Council for Human Rights; the promotion of the governing National Democratic Party’s young cadres to senior posts; and a common effort for change in the overall political culture . In the beginning of 2004, Mubarak has publicly dismissed reports that his youngest son, Gamal, may succeed him.

Sources

Al-Ahram Weekly, 2003-2004 (quoted articles in footnotes)
The Challenge of Political Reform: Egypt After the Iraq War, ICG Middle East Briefing, 30 September 2003.
Al-Ghobashy, Mona, ‘Unsettling the Authorities: Constitutional Reform in Egypt’, Middle East Report, 226, Spring 2003.
Ibrahim, Gamal Abdel Nasser ‘Une Lecture Politique de L’Expérience Constitutionelle Egyptienne’, Egypte-Monde Arabe, N° 2, 1999, pp. 127-142.
Bernard-Maugiron & Dupret Baudouin, ‘Le Prince et Son Juge: Droit et Politique Dans l’Egypte Contemporaine’, Egypte-Monde Arabe, N° 2, 1999, pp. 7-15.

Notes

1) Al-Ghobashy (2003), Bernard-Maugiron et al. (1999), Ibrahim (1999)
2) Ibid.
3) Al-Ghobashy, (2003).
4) Ibid.
5) Ibid.
6) ICG report 30 September, 2003.
7) Ibid.
8) Essam El-Din, Gamal ‘New Posture for NDP’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 3-9 April 2003.
9) Khalil, Nevine, ‘Winds of Change’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 2-8 October 2003 or Howeidy, Amira, ‘tis the season’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 24-30 July 2003.
10) Essam El-Din, Gamal, ‘Dealing with the National Dialogue’ and Abdel-Latif, Omayma, ‘The Politics of Exclusion’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 30/10-5/11 2003.
11) Final statement of the Alexandra Symposium is available in English on www.arabreform.com
12) Essam El-Din, Gamal, ‘Asserting Home-Grown Reform’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 4-10 March 2004.
13) Ibrahim, (1999) and Howeidy, Amira, ‘tis the season’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 24-30 July 2003.
14) 50% of the two chambers must be occupied by peasants and workers.
15) Ibrahim, (1999), p. 136.
16) Howeidy, Amira, ‘Tis the Season’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 24-30 July 2003, ICG Report 30 September 2003.
17) BBC news, ‘Mubarak Denies Succession Reports’, 1 January 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk.