| NAME
OF CONFLICT
STAGE OF CONFLICT Political Dispute to Crisis
HISTORY STATE New Phase
MAIN ACTORS Regime, Opposition Parties, Professional Unions, NGOs, INGOs, Islamic Militants, Community Leaders, IMF, USA, EU
ESCALATORY POTENTIAL Null
VICTIMS No Victims
Concise History of Potential Conflict
Governance in Jordan
Since its creation, Jordan’s governance strategy remained essentially unchanged: giving priority to the state bureaucracy-including the armed forces and security services- as mechanism of nation-building, employment, and social development ; promoting the material well-being of Jordanian citizens mainly in education and health; forging the different indigenous tribal groups and other demographic groups (Palestinians and others) into a single national identity; playing the role of impartial arbitrator by remaining above the fray of domestic tribal and political disputes; and constantly negotiating economic and political aid from foreign and external parties.
However, this style of governance has not been as simple as it seems to be at first glance. In fact, the system of governance in Jordan reflects complex and multi-layered interactions among four basic forces of authority and power in the Kingdom---the Monarchy, Tribalism, Religion, and the Trade-based Institutions of the urban Jordan. These relationships are intermediated through channels such as the state bureaucracy, the parliament, security services, community leaders, and the private sector. To elaborate, as far as direct channels of communication between the state and the citizens is concerned, the regime in Jordan had largely relied on community leaders to play the role of intermediary between the central government and the citizens . These elites have always delivered the local concerns of their constituents and in return they were rewarded by the state for their role through the augmentation of their social and financial status to enable them to continue in their role as intermediaries. This method of communication has long served the majority of Jordanians because inherent in it are structural mechanisms that provide most Jordanians with access to senior decision-makers and, through them, to the resources of the state (e.g. medical treatment, employment, or higher education). In other words, the combination of individualistic patron-client networks along side formal, institutionalized commitments defined the links in Jordan’s governance system and helped the regime to preempt public protests and upsurges.
New Dynamics, Old Techniques
The last decade marked the point at which the abovementioned traditional governance mechanism started to fray, and in some cases (e.g. the recent events in the southern city of Ma’an) broke down completely. In specific, disruption of aid and trade in early 1990s brought chronic fiscal crisis thereby weakening these communal links . The Second Gulf War not only resulted in the forced return of over 300,000 Jordanian workers but the remaining aid subsidies from the Gulf and the US were cut off . Fits of social protest, thus, among politically important groups followed.
The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty in 1994, however, was a landmark in redeeming Jordan within America’s foreign policy milieu in Washington D.C. Jordan spared no effort to utilize this opportunity to rebuild its relations with the United States. To elaborate, in the last several years, the regime has sought stability through application of significant US aid. In particular, by 2003 and after the US war in Iraq, Jordan had forged a solid supra alliance with the US making Jordan, as a US official put it, ‘a vital partner of the US in its war against terror’. The arrival of direct budgetary assistance from the United States as well as loan cancellations has enhanced the country’s foreign currency reserves thereby stabilizing the Dinar’s value.
Notwithstanding these efforts to stabilize the governing system through application of significant foreign aid and trade packages, unrelenting and inherent old methods of governance made communication breakdown between the citizens and the state inevitable. The Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Jordan, although it has dramatically boosted Jordan’s exports to the US and accounted for some minimal foreign investment, has done little to impact the unemployment numbers and there are serious questions about the potential economy-wide benefits of the evolving agreement. The economy could no longer cope with the demands of a growing population, and the citizens became increasingly unsatisfied with the recurring gaps in basic human services and the abuse of power and authority that resulted from a system that lacked formal political and institutional political accountability and checks-and-balances. Moreover, the recent US invasion and occupation of Iraq, while helped the regime in re-establishing aid links and packages, has nonetheless helped to generate domestic opposition that are detrimental for the regime’s efforts to maintain political stability. In specific, the Jordanian regime has recently found it easy to repress popular opposition and steadily erode the liberalizations that were inaugurated in the wake of the 1989 riots.
SOURCES OF RISK AND VULNERABILITY
CATEGORY
Political Indicators (risk: Medium; vulnerability: High)
PROBLEM AREAS AND ISSUES
Regime (risk: Low; vulnerability: Null) Ongoing regime transition Detrimental political leaders’ personality Authoritarian Regime Negative political rights and civil liberty index (Freedom House) Legitimacy deficit of government /regime
Institutions (risk: Medium; vulnerability: Null) Ineffective governance Repressive or discriminatory legal system Lacking or ineffective legal framework
International Relations (risk: High; vulnerability: High) External pressures to adopt international standards Detrimental external actor(s)’s political interventions
Analysis of Problem Areas and Disputed Issues
The main issues debated concerning the governance in Jordan are: • Transparent system of governance [External pressures to adopt international standards, Ineffective governance, Authoritarian Regime] • Law-based methods of governance [Lacking or ineffective legal framework, Ineffective governance] • Equal rights of all citizens [Repressive or discriminatory legal system, Ineffective governance] • Freedom of expression [Negative political rights and civil liberty index] • Foreign Aid [Detrimental external actor(s)’s political interventions, External pressures to adopt international standards]
The average risk factor for political indicators is medium and vulnerability high. However, if we consider problem areas in details, the results change: both the problem areas of regime and institutions have vulnerability null. The vulnerability is high only in international relations since the regime’s capability to endure a situation where its ideological position (in this case Foreign policy) can purchase little popular support is under question. While the potential conflict on ineffective governance is largely contained, the escalation is given by external intervention –mainly through foreign aid [External pressures to adopt international standards; Detrimental external actor(s)’s political interventions]. The recent US invasion and occupation of Iraq, while helped to reinforce Jordan’s aid links and packages, has nonetheless generated domestic opposition that are detrimental for the regime’s efforts to maintain political stability and further undermined the legitimacy of the regime, which is perceived as too vulnerable to external pressures [legitimacy deficit of government/regime, Authoritarian Regime].
LIST OF ACTORS OF CONFLICT
Community Leaders Opposition parties Professional Unions Islamic Militants NGOs INGOs
By Issue: Ineffective Governance; role: adversaries Lacking or ineffective legal framework; role: adversaries Repressive or discriminatory legal system; role: adversaries Negative political rights and civil liberty index (Freedom House); role: adversaries On going regime transition; role: adversaries Detrimental political leaders’ personality; role: adversaries Authoritarian Regime; role: adversaries Legitimacy deficit of government /regime; role: adversaries
IMF USA EU
By Issue: External pressures to adopt international standards; role: adversary Detrimental external actor(s)’s political interventions; role: adversary
Analysis of Nature, Actions, and Agenda of the Actors of Conflict
All opposition parties (including illegal Islamic militants) and civil society agree on the fact that the absence of a genuine public participation and accountability in Jordan is intimately connected to a host of questions that affect the country’s longer-term stability. In their view, the absence of effective political representation, popular participation and government responsiveness- are translated into inadequate mechanisms to express and channel public discontent, thus creating the appropriate milieu for a futile governance structure. In particular, rules-based, law-anchored and transparent system of governance that emphasizes the equal rights of all citizens rather than the traditional, informal governance system based on personal contacts and community leadership is the only safety valve available for the state in Jordan to maintain stability. Notwithstanding the regime’s awareness of this fact, still it is more receptive to demands for reform (mainly economic) emanating from the international community than from its own citizens . In late 2002, the regime launched a generic reform program known as ‘the Jordan First’ initiative. The government defined Jordan First as a means to focus the attention of the citizens on issues of domestic substance, rather than being sidetracked by an excessive and unwanted focus on regional issues. For many among Jordan’s political spectrum, Jordan First is considered as another ‘offensive’ and shortsighted method by the government to absorb the increasing tension stemming from recent political and economic developments without essentially transforming the rules in which political power is exercised in the country.
Sources
Ma’an Abu Nowar, ‘The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: The Creation and Development of Transjordan, 1920-1929’ (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1989), pp. 219-247
Marc Lynch, ‘State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity’ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), passim
Richard parker, “The United States and King Hussein”, in David W. Lesch, ed., ‘The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment’ (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 100-114
‘The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratization and Regional Instability’, ICG Report, Amman/Brussels, 8 October 2003 www.intl-crisis-group.org.
‘Red Alert in Jordan: Recurrent Unrest in Ma’an’, ICG Report presented to HM King Abdullah of Jordan, Amman/Brussels, 19 February 2003 www.intl-crisis-group.org.
‘Ma’an: An Open-ended Crisis’, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman, 2003
Jordan Media Group, ‘Jordan: Keys to the Kingdom’ (Amman: Al Kutb, 1995), pp. 1-24
Freedom House Index http://www.freedomhouse.org/
Jordan Times, 2003
Washington Post, 2003
2. Nawaf Tell, ‘The Ma’an Syndrome’, 2003, (unpublished paper). Also see ‘Ma’an: An Open-ended Crisis’, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman, 2003; ‘Red Alert in Jordan: Recurrent Unrest in Ma’an’, ICG Report presented to HM King Abdullah of Jordan, Amman/Brussels, 19 February 2003
3. Classic Clientalism is exclusive, state-mediated resources directed to social elites in return for political support of their rank and file. For more on this see, David Waldner, ‘State Building and Late Development’ (Cornell University Press, 1999); and William Riker, ‘The Theory of Political Coalitions’ (Yale University Press, 1962).
4. Though introduced sporadically, aid has nonetheless remained a crucial line item of the state’s revenue (from 1973 to 1988, aid averaged 43 percent of the public budget and from 1989 to 1998 it dropped to 20 percent).
5. Jordan’s alliance with the US remained vulnerable to fluctuations in the US interest in the region, of which Jordan was a significant actor. Accordingly, Jordanian-US relations did have a few setbacks, the most notable ones maybe following the 1967 war, and the most recent, and most serious, setback was during the 1990/1 gulf war. During this crisis the Jordanian-US relations plunged to its worst ever in the history of Jordan.
6. Since 1994, Jordan has returned to American favour receiving nearly US $ 3 billion in budgetary support by 2003 (not including two instances of debt forgiveness and increased military aid).
7. Jordan’s trade with the US over the fiscal year 2003 was around $600 Million, making the US Jordan’s biggest trading partner.
8. Pete Moore and Andrew Shrank, ‘Commerce and Conflict: How the US effort to counter terrorism with trade may backfire’, Middle East Policy, September, 2003.
9. Marsha Pripstein Posusney, ‘Globalisation and Labor Protection in Oil-Poor Arab Countries: Racing to the Bottom?’, paper presented at the Conference, ‘The Jordanian Economy in a Changing Environment’, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman, July 2003; also see ‘The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratization and Regional Instability’, ICG Report, Amman/Brussels, 8 October 2003, pp. 9-10
10. Despite new parliamentary elections in June 2003, over 100 temporary laws implemented without parliamentary approval have gone into affect. Detention of opposition and dissent figures has continued unabated as well. See Freedom House Report on Jordan http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings/jordan.htm
11. For an analysis of the relationship between the state and Islamic activists in Jordan, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan (New York: 2001).
12. Jackson Diehl, ‘Jordan’s Democracy Option’, The Washington Post, 21 September 2003. For an analytical review of the 2001 Electoral Law, see Francesca Sawalha, ‘Democratisation in Jordan – The Electoral System’, Amman, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, December 2001.
13. ‘The Challenge of Political Reform’, op cit, p.10; 20
14.
Jordan Times, 25-26 April 2003. Fahed Fanek, ‘
Jordan First
or the Birth of Jordanian Nationalism’,
Daily Star, November 2002. The Jordan First
initiative is available in English translation at
www.pm.gov.jo/english/jordan-first |
